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The New Financial War: Lebanon and its Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Financing of Terrorism Regime, Regional and International Engagements 
 
Waddah M. Safa 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the potential for conflict between domestic Lebanese 
political (and other) pressures and international pressures that is a direct result of 
globalization. This conflict is further highlighted by the nature of the topic at hand: 
money laundering and financing of terrorism, which have seen significant growth due 
to globalization. It also analyzes how the U.S. money laundering laws have impacted 
international anti-money laundering laws and ultimately similar laws and policies in 
Lebanon. It examines how the latest efforts to develop efficient strategies for anti-
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism has led to the 
establishment of financial intelligence units combining several diverse but unified 
aspects of financial systems and law enforcement. This research also provides a 
summarized account of Lebanon’s anti-money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism regime. Through policy and discourse analysis, it explores the 
behavior of the Lebanese financial system in crises showing how the Central Bank’s 
timely intervention in problematic situations has resulted in leveling international and 
domestic political pressures. The main question is: How has Lebanon sustained its 
leading role as one of the most important financial and banking centers in the Middle 
East based on its longstanding banking secrecy practices as well as complied with 
international standards regarding anti-money laundering and combating the financing 
of terrorism; it is hoped that this thesis provides an informative and plausible answer. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
“In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. administration 
pressured the United Nations to adopt tough measures to suppress the 
financing of terrorism. And on September 28, 2001, the U.N. Security Council 
adopted Resolution 1373. Invoking Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, 
Resolution 1373 called on all states to prevent and suppress the financing of 
terrorist acts and to criminalize the willful provision or collection … of funds 
by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should 
be used … to carry out terrorist acts. The resolution strengthened the hand of 
the Bush Administration as it embarked on its war on terrorism.”1 
 
Over the past years, US Congress has approved several laws for combating 
money laundering the most significant of which is the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
that was followed by a broad Executive Order No. 13244, issued by President George 
W. Bush on September 24, 2001, “blocking the assets of, and prohibiting transactions 
with, a number of persons and entities believed to be terrorists or fronts, including 
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda organization.”2 The order set the stage for a 
worldwide noose the United States threatens to tighten around nations and financial 
institutions that harbor or support what the US deems to be terrorist financing. 
Included in this threat are closing the door to US financial markets and dollar 
clearance facilities and seizure of accounts of foreign financial institutions, including 
their correspondent accounts at US banks. 
The G-7 followed suit when, on September 25, 2002, they declared that they 
would also “block the assets of terrorists and their associates and pursue a 
                                                             
1 Baroudi, Sami E. (2005). U.S.-Lebanese Relations in the 21st Century: A View from Beirut. The Arab 
World Geographer (Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 201.) 
2 Zagaris, Bruce. The merging of the counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering regimes, Law and 
Policy in International Business (Fall 2002). 
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comprehensive strategy to disrupt terrorists.”3 The G-7 also called on the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), at the OECD in Paris, to include terrorist financing into 
its activities, which it has accomplished by expanding, in October 2001, its mandate 
to include combating the financing of terrorism and the issuance of the Eight (later 
expanded to nine) Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. 
Lebanon obliged, and the Central Bank established, by virtue of Law 318 of 
April 20, 2001 (Fighting Money Laundering), the Special Investigation Commission 
(SIC) as an independent, legal entity with judicial status. Chaired by the Governor of 
the Central Bank, “the SIC is the financial intelligence unit of Lebanon mandated to 
receiving, analyzing, and disseminating disclosures of operations suspected of 
concealing money laundering, and monitoring compliance with the regulations and 
procedures stipulated by the Law 318 (Article 6/1), as well as the lifting of banking 
secrecy provisions (Banking Secrecy Law of 1956) to the benefit of competent 
judicial authorities and the Higher Banking Commission.”4 
Under the provisions of Law 318 (Article 1/3), terrorist acts are to be 
understood as “specified in Articles 314, 315 and 316 of the Lebanese Criminal Code 
as well as to finance or to contribute to the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts, or 
terrorist organizations, according to the concept of terrorism in the Lebanese Penal 
Code.”5 Still, Lebanon should consider joining the U.N. Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) and for the Ministry of Justice to 
review certain provisions of the Penal Code. 
                                                             
3 “G7/G8 Counter-terrorism cooperation since September 11th backgrounder,” 
www.g8.fr/...2002/g8_counter-terrorism 
4 “AML/CFT Laws & Regulations,” Special Investigation Commission 2010 Annual Report Section 
III, pp. 57-58, http://www.sic.gov.lb/downloads/Eng_SIC_2007.pdf 
5 Ibid. 
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1.2 Research Question, Relevance of the Study, and Methodology 
This subsection shows the significance of the research question and 
methodology undertaken to the field of international relations in an ever more 
interdependent world economy. The new war on terrorism that started with the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on US soil has lead to a tsunami of successive Governments’ 
regulations and anti-measures including sanctions against terrorists and state-sponsors 
of terrorism. Furthermore, the methodology used will focus on analyzing the 
theoretical framework of laws and by-laws and international regimes that structure 
combating the financing of terrorism and money laundering counter-measures. 
While Lebanon strives to maintain the banking secrecy law, it is being urged 
to address international pressures regarding money-laundering and the financing of 
terrorism. The banking secrecy law states that “it is an offense for any bank employee, 
including top management, to reveal their knowledge of clients’ names, assets, or 
holdings to any individual, even those in authority, without the written authorization 
of the client.”6 
With this and other related changes in the way the financial system is 
addressing change in international context, this thesis will seek to answer the 
following question: How has Lebanon sustained its leading role as one of the most 
important financial and banking centers in the region based on its longstanding 
banking secrecy practices as well as complied with the anti-money laundering and 
combating the financing of terrorism international standards? 
The significance of the research undertaken stems from the novelty of such a 
study which, to my knowledge, seems lacking and has yet to be addressed in the 
                                                             
6 Barazy, Ma’an, “The Lender of First Resort: An Anatomy of Resilience,” (Data Invest Arabia INC, 
Policy and Research Papers; 1st ed. June 2009): p.49-51. 
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political science literature? The importance of the research question also stems from 
the need to explore the ramifications of twenty-first century security (terrorist) threats 
and to highlight the potential for conflict between international (mainly U.S.) 
pressures and domestic politics that is a direct result of globalization. Furthermore, the 
topic is of current interest amidst raising international anti-terrorism sentiments. 
Arguably at the lead of these changes is the US, which is exercising its power through 
use of stick and carrot policies to compel target states to change their behavior. This 
research aims to contribute to the field of study by examining the extent to which the 
financing of terrorism is being discussed in the security context and the influence of 
non-state actors’ threats on foreign policy formation. 
The methodology used in the thesis is the case study model, where it will 
focus on analyzing the framework which makes use of international and domestic 
levels of analysis. According to Waltz, “if the international system level is the focus, 
then the explanation rests with the anarchic characteristics of that system or with 
international and regional organizations and their strengths and weaknesses. If the 
domestic level is the focus, then the explanation is derived from characteristics of the 
state: the type of government, the type of economic system, interest groups within the 
country, or even the national interest.”7 
The significance of levels of analysis in the study of international relations 
was further discussed by Singer who argued that “one’s choice of a particular level of 
analysis determines what one will and will not see since different levels tend to 
emphasize different actors and processes.”8 
                                                             
7 Waltz, Kenneth N., Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954); and 
Singer, David J., “The Levels of Analysis Problem,” International Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. 
Rosenau, James N., (Rev. ed.; New York: Free Press, 1961), 20-29. 
8 Singer, David J., “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” in International 
Politics and Foreign Policy, ed. Rosenau, James N., (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 20-29. 
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International relations theorists tend to be interested in patterns of behavior 
among various international actors for which modest predictions about the possible 
nature and direction of change can be made. In this thesis three alternative images or 
perspectives of international relations are emphasized and labeled: realism, pluralism, 
and globalism. It is argued that these images or divisions have provided the basis for 
the development of many theoretical works that attempt to explain various aspects of 
international relations. 
For realists, states represent the key unit of analysis in the international 
system; hence, any study of the latter will involve the study of relations among these 
units. As for non-state actors, international organizations such as the United Nations 
(though this is more accurately described as an inter-governmental organization), 
multi-national corporations, terrorist groups, and other transnational organizations are 
of less importance. The state, as a unitary actor – having one policy at any given time 
on any particular subject, is fundamentally a rational decision-making unit evaluating 
available alternatives and making preferences maximizing benefit or minimizing cost 
connected with achieving the objectives required. Power is a key concept to the 
realists who view national security and strategic issues as high politics, whereas 
economic and social issues are viewed as low politics. 
The pluralist or liberal view deems non-state actors important and independent 
entities in their own right. For liberals, state decisions result from bureaucracies, 
interest groups, and individuals are tied by competition, coalition building, conflict, 
and compromise among these actors. Hence, attempting to reach a consensus or at 
least a minimum pleasing partnership is a procedure far different in kind from the 
realists’ account of state as a rational actor. Finally, economic and social issues are 
constantly at the forefront of the liberal agenda of international politics. 
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The third perspective, globalism deems the global environment within which 
states and other entities interact as the starting point of analysis. To understand the 
external behavior of states requires examining domestic factors and the structure of 
the system that conditions and influences states and non-state actors to act as 
mechanisms of domination in a world capitalist system by which some manage to 
benefit at the expense of others. Globalists believe that economics is central to 
understanding the creation, evolution, and functioning of the contemporary world 
system.  In particular, they are typically concerned with the development and 
maintenance of dependency relations among North-South states. 
The theoretical framework of the thesis will include the international system 
(distribution of power among states, geography, technology, and other factors) on one 
hand and the state (often treated as a unified actor) and society or regime (democratic, 
authoritarian, etc.) on the other hand. It is also quite typical for these levels to be used 
to “explain the foreign policy behavior of states – the dependent variable. The state, in 
other words, is often the unit of analysis, and explaining its behavior could entail 
taking into account factors at different levels of analysis.”9 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
The concept of interdependence is discussed by the proponents of all three 
images of international relations, but the pluralists take it to heart because it captures 
much of the essence of their view of world politics. Interdependence is to pluralists 
what balance of power is to realists and what dependency is to globalists. 
Interdependence specifies that two or more units are dependent on one another. While 
pluralists have argued that the term provides a simpler and more accurate explanation 
                                                             
9 Viotti, Paul R. and Kauppi, Mark V. “International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
and Beyond,” (3rd ed.; Longman Publishers; 1999), pp. 13-16. 
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of the current nature of world politics than does the concept of balance of power, 
realists tend to see interdependence as the vulnerability of one state to another, a view 
that suggests that it is to be avoided or at least minimized. 
Keohane and Nye determined that “interdependence involves reciprocal 
effects among countries or among actors in different countries. Although there are 
costs associated with interdependence, defined as sensitivity, benefits to either or both 
parties may outweigh these costs.”10 Pluralists focus on the multiple channels linking 
societies, including inter-state, trans-governmental, and trans-national relations. 
Somehow, there is a “decided absence of hierarchy among issues such that 
socioeconomic issues may be as or more important than security issues. Moreover, 
when such complex interdependence exists, military force tends to have less utility in 
the resolution of conflicts.”11 
Managing interdependent relations may even involve construction of sets of 
rules, procedures, and associated institutions or international organizations to govern 
interactions in these issue areas – so-called international regimes. Consistent with this 
understanding, Krasner defines regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, 
rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in 
a given area of international relations.”12 
As such, international regimes are not the same as international organizations 
– they do not have a mailing address. They are constructs defined by observers – an 
analytical concept. Regimes may accompany an organization, but the former do not 
have the capacity to act. Furthermore, an international organization associated with a 
                                                             
10 Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., “Power and Interdependence” (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1977), p.8. 
11 See Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, p. 24-29. 
12 Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” 
in International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2. 
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particular regime may concern itself with more than one regime or issue area – the 
United Nations, for example. 
Three main parts make up for the foundation of the analysis. The first provides 
an extensive literature review and theoretical context that will entail a comprehensive 
analysis of the characteristics and features of terrorism and US foreign policy. The 
second part focuses on the analysis of the policy outputs of the Financial Action Task 
Force Recommendations on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism. It shows how the FATF was set about and how its mandate was expanded 
throughout the years to include special recommendations on combating the financing 
of terrorism and its tool of naming and shaming to monitor compliance with the 
recommendations. The third part focuses on the discourse analysis of the assessment 
of Lebanon’s AML/CFT regime that was conducted by the Middle East and North 
Africa Financial Action Task Force. It involves a discussion of the report that was 
issued by the MENAFATF and provides insight on what is needed for the future. 
The overall time frame for the thesis is from the mid-1980s underlying the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to the present day. Although there is a long 
history of terrorism, 9/11 marks the intensification of terrorist attacks or perceived 
threats from non-state actors on western soil revealing the environment of new 
security challenges including global money laundering and terrorist financing. 
1.4 Plan of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters, including an introduction and a 
conclusion. The introduction lays out the topic and highlights why it is important. In 
addition, it places the topic in a theoretical framework that emphasizes the potential 
for conflict between domestic Lebanese political (and other) pressures and 
international pressures that is a direct result of globalization. As previously noted, this 
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conflict is further highlighted by the nature of the topic at hand: money laundering 
and terrorist financing, which themselves have seen major growth owing to 
globalization. Lastly, the chapter tackles the methodology used to answer the thesis 
question. 
Chapter two provides a thorough overview on what the Financial Action Task 
Force is and how it works. It describes how the FATF mandate has expanded over the 
years helped by an ever-growing consensus on the dangers money laundering and 
terrorist financing represent. It examines how the FATF recommendations and their 
implementation have become the core of FATF’s effort to preserve the integrity of the 
financial system. It also explains the sophisticated tools the FATF has honed over the 
years to monitor compliance with the recommendations, including its procedure for 
following up on shortcomings and publicly identifying high-risk and non-cooperative 
jurisdictions having persistent strategic weaknesses. 
Chapter three focuses on US money laundering laws and lays the groundwork 
for how these have impacted the international standards and ultimately similar laws 
and policies in Lebanon. On October 26, 2001, President George W. Bush signed the 
most far-reaching law enacted in the United States since the New Deal legislation of 
Franklin Roosevelt’s time. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 bolsters the potency of the 
money laundering laws and Bank Secrecy Act to levels unseen since they were 
enacted in 1986 and 1970 respectively. Encouraged by the strong congressional desire 
to close the avenues of terrorist financing, the laws now reach levels of coverage and 
scope that would not have been possible had it not been for the events of 9/11. 
Chapter four demonstrates how the efforts that have been exerted recently to 
build up anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism regimes 
bring together multipurpose yet interrelated aspects of financial systems and criminal 
10 
 
law. In this regard, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) make up for an essential 
component of these regimes through which critical information on suspicious 
accounts is made available to various but complementary law-enforcement agencies 
allowing them to trace illicit proceeds of crimes regardless of the banking secrecy 
policies. 
Chapter five provide a summarized account on the eminent role of the Central 
Bank of Lebanon, above all its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of 
terrorism regime’s assessment that was conducted by the MENAFATF in November 
2009. It further elucidates and analyses Lebanon’s money laundering and financing of 
terrorism counter-measures, assesses its compliance with the FATF recommendations 
and presents the suggested action plan to improve the AML/CFT regime. 
The concluding chapter seeks to summarize various discussions in the thesis 
and provides an answer to the central research question: Can Lebanon sustain its 
leading role as one of the most important financial and banking centers in the region 
based on its longstanding banking secrecy practices as well as comply with 
international pressures regarding anti-money laundering and combating the financing 
of terrorism international standards? 
1.5 Challenges to Answering the Research Question 
Unprecedented developments in world politics since the end of the Cold War 
have led to a growing number of other concerns emerging at the forefront of the 
international political agenda which demonstrate the complexity and interdependence 
of world politics. Since the methodology used in this research is the case study model, 
where the thesis examines the potential for conflict between domestic Lebanese 
political pressures and international pressures that is further highlighted by the nature 
of the topic at hand: money laundering and financing of terrorism which have seen 
11 
 
significant growth due to globalization; this study suffers from being too wide on a 
multiple issue areas and hence being unable to provide a simple answer to the 
question raised. This challenge is a source of on-going debate in the social sciences, 
and proponents of the case study model have been so far able to demonstrate the 
capability of their model to highlight and produce some really helpful theories and 
lessons. Another limitation that thwarts this work, due to the constricting perimeters 
of the MA thesis, will be the absence of personal interviews and field research which 
would have added some new and useful data to the study. Consequently, this thesis 
relies on the available literature. The literature on international regimes implicitly 
suggests that a regime must have a single issue that it seeks to regulate. The concept 
of an issue, however, suffers from lack of clarification in current International 
Relations literature. This thesis will show that the terrorism phenomenon is too multi-
faceted and multi-dimensional to be viewed as a single issue, as an analysis of the 
values and the stakes evoked will demonstrate. 
Robert Litan, an economist at the Brookings Institution in Washington, 
describes regional and international financial contagions as “a direct consequence of a 
process of globalization that has also facilitated the transmission of financial crises 
across national borders.”13 The financial crisis of 2008, globally labeled the most 
horrific economic crisis since the Great Depression of the last century, has broadly 
harmed the international financial system, many individuals, local communities, non-
financial businesses and national and international interests that rely upon that system. 
Money laundering and terrorist financing were not the cause of that mischief; 
for there is no evidence to suggest that both have changed as a consequence of the 
crisis in any significant way to the changes in behavior of honest citizens. Yet it is 
                                                             
13 Litan, Robert E. “Economics: Global Finance,” in Managing Global Issues (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001). 
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more probable that “the policy responses to the crisis are likely to benefit the global 
AML/CFT efforts by improving transparency and ensuring more rigorous assurance 
procedures in the financial system.”14 
In the context of the international financial system, it is useful to distinguish 
between the transparency and accountability of three groups of participants: the 
private sector, national authorities, and international financial institutions. “The 
decisions made by any one of these groups are affected by the decisions, or 
anticipated decisions, of the other two. And there is plenty of room for significant 
improvement in the transparency and accountability of these groups.”15 
Moreover, Seiichi Kondo, Deputy Secretary General of the OECD, in the 
opening speech at the High Level Consultations on OECD Harmful Tax Competition 
on January 8, 2001, stated that “globalization can pose problems, not just for 
individuals, but for governments as well. New opportunities are opened up for 
individuals and enterprises to engage in illegal activities, such as hard core cartels, 
bribery, money laundering and tax abuses, which distort trade and investment. . . . We 
must urgently address this dark side of globalization if we are to maintain broad 
political support for open markets and for the benefits that these can bring in terms of 
greater freedom and choice for citizens and enterprises worldwide.”16 
Meanwhile, over US concerns that Syria, Iran and Hezbollah are using 
Lebanon’s financial system to evade international sanctions and fund their activities, 
the Obama administration has intensified its scrutiny of Lebanon’s banking sector. 
The Treasury Department has pressed the Central Bank to more closely monitor local 
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banks that have operations in Damascus and Tehran. US officials have also expressed 
concerns over Hezbollah’s close military alliance with Syria and Iran and their control 
of the government. Riyad Salameh, Governor of the Central Bank, exclaimed that the 
“Government has stepped up its efforts over the past year to combat money 
laundering through Beirut,”17 and that “deposits by Syrian nationals in Lebanese 
banks, both inside Syria and Lebanon, as well as loans granted to Syrians by these 
banks, have decreased by 40% over the past 15 months, without citing the dollar 
figures.”18 
 
Pundits contend that “terrorism is clearly one response to globalization.”19 The 
shocking events of September 11, 2001 created an abrupt awareness of terrorists’ 
presence, their organizational capabilities, their multinational composition, the extent 
of their malice, and their ongoing capacity to produce enormous, and possibly 
unrivaled, harm. Formed into relatively small but cohesive units, terrorist groups have 
demonstrated that they possess both the means and the will to act. Their deep-seated 
purpose is to obtain publicity for their cause and to acquire cohorts for future 
activities. The proliferation of home-grown terrorists has resulted from local 
conditions. The successes of the Al-Qaeda have been a source of inspiration. Local 
leaders have had the responsibility for building their own infrastructures. The local 
successes, and there have been many, in Asia, Europe, the US, and in November 2002 
in Kenya, and in May 2003 in Saudi Arabia, have been the product of a decentralized 
approach. It is evident that these successes have, on the whole, been in democratically 
oriented countries; not in totalitarian states. 
                                                             
17 The Daily Star, “Salameh: Banking sector abides by law,” July 10, 2012. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Terrorism, in the sense of intentional harms to civilians, is not a modern phenomenon. C. Carr, The 
Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare against Civilians (2002). A general reference is the 
Department of State publication, Patterns of Global Terrorism. 
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1.6 Terrorism 
Terrorism is a particular kind of asymmetric warfare that has increasingly 
become a major international security threat. Terrorist attacks against an adversary’s 
population, such as those carried out by Al-Qaeda against US embassies in Africa in 
1998, against cities on US soil in 2001, the bombing of the Madrid rail station in 
2004, and the London subway attack in 2005 have ushered in a new era of terrorism. 
Scholars have emphasized the changing nature of terrorism in the 1990s and its global 
reach and adaptive nature. Terrorism engages “four main elements: (1) premeditation, 
the decision by a perpetrator to commit an act to instill terror or fear in others; (2) 
motivation or a cause, whether it is political, religious, or economic; (3) targets, 
usually noncombatants, such as political figures, bureaucrats, or innocent bystanders; 
and (4) secrecy, where perpetrators belong to clandestine groups or are secretly 
sponsored by states.”20 
“Terrorism has a lengthy record, starting in Greek and Roman times; terrorist 
acts were often carried out by individuals against a ruler. In the Middle Ages, 
factions perpetuated violence against other factions, while during the French 
Revolution, acts of terrorism were sponsored by the state itself. Organized 
state terrorism used against a state’s own citizens reached its climax in Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin. Terrorists began to use 
aircraft hijackings in the 1970s to communicate their message. For example, in 
December 1973, Arab terrorists killed thirty-two people in Rome’s airport 
during an attack on a US aircraft. Hostages were taken in support of the 
hijackers’ demand for the release of imprisoned Palestinians. In 1976, a 
French plane with mostly Israeli passengers was hijacked by a Middle Eastern 
organization and flown to Uganda, where the hijackers threatened to kill the 
hostages unless Arab prisoners in Israel were released.”21 
Much of the current terrorist activities have their roots in the Middle East – in 
the Palestinians’ quest for self-determination and their own internal conflicts over 
strategy, in the hostility among various Islamic groups toward Western powers, and in 
                                                             
20 Pillar, Paul R., “Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy,” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2001), pp. 13-14. 
21 Mingst, Karen A. Essentials of International Relations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
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the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism. Among the groups with roots in the 
Middle East are Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestine Islamic Jihad. Since September 11, 
2001, Al-Qaeda organization has been the most publicized. A shadowy network of 
Islamic fundamentalism from several countries, including countries outside of the 
Middle East, Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden, is motivated by its desire to install 
Islamic regimes in the Middle East, support Islamic insurgencies in Southeast Asia, 
and punish the United States for its support of Israel and for its close ties with corrupt 
regimes in the Middle East. 
“Highlighting the changing nature of terrorism in the 1990s, scholars 
emphasize its global reach and adaptive nature. There are three key features to 
the contemporary terrorist threat. First, there is evidence of a more global 
character with a majority of the attacks being carried out by associated cells 
with roots in the Middle East, Africa, and the Caucasus. Second, terrorist 
attacks have increased since 9/11 and this drastic increase in terrorist threat 
has been a result of Al-Qaeda’s transformation from a group into a movement. 
Lastly, there is significant evidence that Al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations have adapted their structure significantly.”22 
Since the 1990s, terrorism has taken a new turn. The acts have become more 
dangerous, “almost one-quarter of terrorist attacks resulted in deaths, compared to 17 
percent in the 1970s. Until 2000, the worst loss of life came from the 1985 bombing 
of an Air India flight in which 329 people were killed. That changed dramatically on 
September 11, 2001, when over 3000 civilians died and $80 billion in economic 
losses were incurred. The choice of weapons used by terrorists has become more 
diverse. The infrastructure used to support terrorism has also become more 
sophisticated. It is financed through money laundering schemes and illegal criminal 
activities.”23 
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Responding to terrorism has become increasingly difficult, because most 
perpetrators have networks of supporters in the resident populations. Protecting 
populations from random acts of violence is an almost impossible task, given the 
availability of guns and bombs in the international market-place and the necessity, at 
least in Western democratic states, of balancing civil and human rights with anti-
terrorist legislation. 
The international community has taken action against terrorists mainly by 
creating a framework of international standards dealing with terrorism, including a 
number of conventions that address such issues as punishing hijackers and those who 
protect them; protecting airports, diplomats, and nuclear materials in transport; and 
blocking the flow of financial resources to global terrorist networks. In recognizing 
the threat posed to the international financial system and to financial institutions, the 
Financial Action Task Force has been at the forefront of measures to counter attempts 
to abuse the global financial system to further criminal and terrorist purposes. 
Steps have also been taken by individual states to increase state security, such 
as in the United States through the passage of the controversial USA PATRIOT Act; 
to support counter-intelligence activities; and to promote cooperation among national 
enforcement agencies in tracking and apprehending terrorists. Countries that have 
been seen as supporting terrorists, or not taking effective counter-measures, have been 
sanctioned by other states. Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, and Iraq are 
prominent examples of targeted sanctioning by the US Government. 
Control over the financial resources of terrorists can play a critical role. To 
this end, the United States, many foreign states, and the United Nations, as well as a 
host of other international organizations can impose certain limitations to prevent the 
movement of funds across national borders for the benefit of resident terrorists. The 
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thesis now turns to the next chapter to argue how the Financial Action Task Force 
international standards that was, originally, meant for combating money laundering 
has expanded over the years to cover financing of terrorism counter-measures.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 THE FATF SOFT-LAW: BUILDING CONCENSUS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a thorough overview of what the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) is and how its mandate has expanded over the years helped by an ever-
growing consensus on the threats money laundering and financing of terrorism 
represent. It shows how the FATF’s recommendations and their implementation has 
become the core of FATF's attempts to maintain the integrity of the financial system. 
By means of a sophisticated apparatus that the FATF has perfected over many years,  
it is largely able to monitor compliance with the Recommendations, including a 
procedure for following up on deficiencies and openly identifying high-risk and non-
cooperative jurisdictions having persistent strategic weaknesses through its naming 
and shaming mechanism. 
Moreover, this chapter provides further insight into the FATF's ability to face 
up to new or unanticipated developments that may pose a risk to the financial system, 
and examines the extent to which the FATF Special Recommendations on combating 
the financing of terrorism and UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1373 have 
been implemented and the difficulties in applying international law instruments where 
measures are aimed at non-state actors and assets as well as ensuring that individuals 
affected by these measures have adequate legal recourses. 
2.2 Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Threats 
Although they differ on purpose, money laundering and terrorist financing 
share a common infrastructure—the international financial system—to realize their 
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non-benign objectives: the former for the profit motive the latter to make a political 
statement. The success of the FATF makes it an ideal candidate for combating 
terrorist financing. An effective counter-terrorist financing strategy must reflect the 
adaptive and global nature of terrorist groups. Some of the challenges facing states in 
combating terrorist financing are assessing threats and understanding terrorists’ 
behavior with the aim for establishing and implementing an effective global response 
that requires coordination points, flexibility, and states’ compliance. 
As noted earlier, “In the 1990s, a number of issues has ushered in a new age of 
terrorism evident more than ever in the Al-Qaeda network. First, the global nature of 
terrorist attacks being carried out by groups associated with Al-Qaeda. Second, the 
major inflate of terrorist threat has been a result of Al-Qaeda's alteration from a 
faction into a movement and, third the fact that Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups 
have successfully customized their structures.”24 
Therefore, in view of an ever changing global threat, an equally dynamic 
counter-terrorist financing strategy is vital. This has been sought by the UN request 
that states increase dynamism and compliance. In Resolution 1617, the Security 
Council “asserts that the standard-setting, coordinating, and capacity-building efforts 
of the FATF embody the mechanism for counter-terrorist financing.”25 The FATF’s 
Typologies Exercises, Best Practices, and Guidance have supported implementation 
of relevant UN resolutions and provided an annual forum for countries for exploring 
terrorist financing methods. 
The FATF’s counter-terrorist financing strategy has faced three central 
challenges: solid denial of assets, knowledge of terrorist threats, and vigorous state 
compliance. Accessible political and financial systems are vital to terrorist support 
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and activities, thus requiring a counter-terrorist strategy that dismantles the enabling 
environment of terrorism, with the real denial of assets taking priority. The 
international community has become more sensitive to the primary role of financing 
in global terrorism. Thus, by following the money, the task of preventing a future 
terrorist attack has focused on disrupting financing channels of transnational 
terrorism. 
Money laundering, the technique by which proof of money's illicit origins has 
been obscured or separated through multiple, layered transactions in the financial 
system, is hypothetically and empirically tied to contemporary terrorist activity. As 
such, “the goal is to conceal or hide the tainted ownership of the money and provide 
legitimacy for it. In each case, the troubles have both domestic and transnational 
aspects.”26 
Unlike money laundering, terrorist financing generally involves financial 
resources originating from legitimate businesses to support illegitimate activities, 
rather than the reverse, setting up a major impediment in tracing the money. 
Moreover, conventional money laundering involves a profit motive while, usually, 
terrorist financing has (largely) non-economic motives. A last dissimilarity is in their 
scope. Traditional money launderers deal with large cash deposits while terrorists deal 
with substantially lesser amounts of money which makes detecting terrorist financing 
a more difficult task, leading to criticism that tracking the money is a marginal 
strategy in countering terrorism. 
While the final figures of blocked and seized assets are certainly a success, a 
UN report on sanctions to block Al-Qaeda funds asserts that “the point isn’t grabbing 
dollars in bank accounts… It is destroying the financial infrastructure of terrorism. 
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That means seizing money, but it also involves dismantling the channels of funding, 
deterring those who would give aid and support to terrorists, and following the leads 
to terrorist cells.”27 
Despite the differences between money laundering and terrorist financing, the 
similarities allow countries to utilize the same techniques and mechanisms developed 
nationally and internationally to counter each. International tools such as Customer 
Due Diligence and Suspicious Transaction Reports can be of great use as investigative 
devices to determine not only the source of funds but also their destination. Moreover, 
international cooperation mechanisms are situated for the exchange of information, 
blocking funds, and shutting down channels used to transfer funds. In order to evade 
these obstacles, “terrorists utilize techniques that are non-transparent; sometimes they 
use legitimate systems with illicit merchandise or illegitimate systems such as trade-
based money laundering.”28 
In constantly adapting to changes in the global environment, terrorists 
relentlessly prey upon the least developed financial systems as well as utilizing the 
financial infra-structure of developed ones. As noted before, “understanding the 
factors that induce and condition compliance with counter-terrorist global standards is 
significant to the effectiveness of the international endeavor. States are fundamental in 
the compliance process. In particular, compliance is a function of a state's 
capability.”29 
A lack of effectual state power is a window of vulnerability for the state, 
creating conditions where violence and illicit activities, such as money laundering and 
terrorist financing, thrive. Weak states or low-capacity states face difficulties in 
complying, while some states, regardless of strength, are averse to comply. A state’s 
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intent to comply is the pillar for compliance and there is no substitute for the 
engagement of self-interest. Compliance is a consequential choice made by rational 
actors who reflect a claim that the costs of violation outweigh its benefits. 
Full and efficient roll-out of counter-terrorist standards in all countries is one 
of the fundamental tasks of the FATF, who, as an inter-governmental body, has 
produced a Guidance on Capacity Building for Mutual Evaluations and 
Implementation of the FATF Standards within Low-Capacity Countries. The 
document identifies some principles and specific mechanisms and procedures that 
may be used by low-capacity countries to attain successful prioritization and 
implementation of FATF standards. 
2.3 The Impact of the International Political Economy 
For Stephen Krasner, the “international political economy (IPE) is concerned 
with the political determinants of international economic relations.”30 IPE tackles 
questions such as: How have changes in the international distribution of power among 
states affected the degree of openness in the international trading system? Do the 
domestic political structures and values of some states allow them to compete more 
effectively? When can international economic ties among states be used for political 
leverage? 
Going further, IPE has been dominated by four major perspectives – 
liberalism, realism, domestic politics, and Marxism. Only the first three will be 
discussed in this chapter. However, “the central debate in IPE has been between 
liberal and realist analysts. The first has focused on the incentives and opportunities 
for cooperation; while the latter has focused on how power has influenced both the 
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character of international regimes and conflicts among nations.”31 Krasner goes on to 
claim that “explanations which emphasize the interaction between domestic and 
international politics, the way in which domestic structures, values and groups 
influence international relations and vice versa have, in some specific cases, been 
deeply illuminating, but no one has presented a coherent general theory.”32 
The explanatory variable for liberalism is the configuration of interests and 
capabilities associated with a given issue area; that is, outcomes, including the 
creating of institutions designed to secure Pareto optimal outcomes (situations in 
which no actor can be made better off without making some other actor worse off), 
are a function of the preferences and capabilities of a variety of different actors 
concerned with maximizing their own individual utility. 
The evidence that is needed for a liberal analysis involves specifying the 
relevant actors (states, multinationals, etc.), assessing their resources and signifying 
their objectives (including not only their interests but also the constraints and 
incentives that are presented by existing institutional structures and other actors). 
Every theoretical perspective works with an exemplary problem which is 
assumed to be the most important kind of issue in the international system and which 
can be analyzed using the theoretical tools (assumptions, evidence and causal 
arguments) of that approach. The exemplary problem for contemporary liberal 
analysis is market failure; that is, situations in which the purely individual 
calculations of interest do not lead to Pareto optimal outcomes. 
Liberalism offers a basically benign image of the global economy. There are 
many different actors with varying interests yet opportunities exist for cutting deals 
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where everyone can be better off at the same time. Human ingenuity and intelligence 
can create new institutions that encourage behavior that leads to Pareto optimal ends. 
“The liberal cooperation theory analyses market failure problems where states 
may fail to maximize their own utility because individual self-interested 
behavior results, in some cases, such as a prisoner’s dilemma payoff structure 
or the provision of collective goods, in a Pareto suboptimal outcome. These 
failures can often be resolved by the creation of institutional arrangements that 
provide information, monitoring and salient solutions. Cooperation theory 
relies on analytic techniques, mainly game theory and rational choice which 
are heuristically very potent in probing various issues related to trade, finance, 
the environment and economic sanctions.”33 
 
The explanatory variable for realism is the distribution of power among states. 
The basic claim of realism is that given a particular distribution of power among 
states it is possible to explain both the characteristics of the system and the behavior 
of individual states. Realism makes no effort to probe the domestic determinants of 
foreign policy; what counts is state power and external constraints. 
The evidence that realists utilize requires operationalizing the power of states 
by; for instance, looking at the size of armies, aggregate economic output, or the 
ability to make credible threats. 
While Waltz claims that the explanatory problem for realism is “to explain 
how zero sum or distributional conflicts are resolved given the power and interests of 
states,”34 Krasner, approvingly, notes that “the world is a hazardous place where 
economic transactions among states can, in some circumstances, be used for political 
leverage. States exert great efforts to define international regimes because different 
regimes have different distributional consequences.”35 
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Realist analyses of international political economy have addressed two kinds 
of issues: first, how national power has influenced relations among specific countries; 
and second, how the distribution of power in the system as a whole has determined 
international regimes. One basic expectation of realist analyses is that there will be 
tension, although not necessarily war, among the major states in the international 
system regardless of their domestic political structures. 
Albert Hirschman’s National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade 
(1945) remains one of the most illuminating discussions of the way in which power 
affects international economic relations among specific countries. He argues that 
“there are two ways in which trading relations could be used to alter the 
capabilities or policies of another state: first, states could limit the availability 
of critical products or technology in an effort to weaken the resource base of 
their opponents; second, one state could attempt to change the foreign policy 
behavior of another by threatening to change the rules of the game governing 
their economic transactions.”36 
 
The second major emphasis of realism has been the relationship between the 
distribution of power among states in the international system and the nature of 
international economic regimes. The most prominent argument along these lines is the 
realist version of hegemonic stability theory which asserts that “a stable open 
international economic system is most likely when there is a hegemonic distribution 
of power; that is, when there is one state that is much larger than any of the others.”37 
There is also a liberal version of hegemonic stability theory which calls for “the need 
for a hegemonic state to provide collective goods, especially acting as a leader of last 
resort in the financial sector.”38 
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The last theoretical focus of IPE has been the relationship between domestic 
politics and the international system. There have been two general lines of inquiry. 
The first is that there is no dominant argument about the influence of the international 
system on domestic political structures. The second line of argument points to the 
influence of domestic factors such as interest groups, values and ideas. International 
economic policy, like any other policy, can be explained by the pattern of domestic 
pressures. Internationally competitive industries and factors will opt for openness; 
import competing industries will favor closure. 
While the United States remains the only global power, its capabilities in 
many important issue areas have deteriorated, suggesting that it will adopt a more 
narrowly self-interested policy. The United States will be less concerned about 
keeping with international economic rules that are not optimal for it, even if such 
rules would provide greater benefits for the system as a whole. In the late, 1990s, 
Washington found itself regularly alone and on the other side of such issues as the 
Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Land 
Mine Convention, the Kyoto Climate Protocol, or the International Criminal Court. 
From a realist perspective, Josef Joffe argues that  
“the charges of arrogant unilateralism levied against George W. Bush miss the 
other half of the target; for the roots of Bushist unilateralism reach back to his 
predecessor’s era. The Clintonites signed on to the Kyoto Climate Protocol in 
1997, but let the years pass without submitting the treaty to the Senate. The 
administration did not accede to the Land Mine Ban, on the sound calculation 
that it needed land mines to protect its far-flung forces around the world, 
especially along the demilitarized zone between the two Koreas. After lengthy 
foot-dragging, Clinton signed up for the International Criminal Court in the 
last days of his administration, but he did not submit the treaty to an unwilling 
Senate. Prudence was the better part of goodness, given the unpleasant 
prospect that a country most likely to be embroiled in violence beyond its 
borders would also be most likely to expose its soldiers to international 
prosecution.”39 
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By the same token, Charles Krauthammer, one of the most articulate 
spokesman of the neoconservative faith, which enjoyed a longish ascendency in the 
inner sanctum of American power, claims that “in place of realism or liberal 
internationalism, the last four-and-a-half years have seen an unashamed assertion and 
deployment of American power, a resort to unilateralism when necessary, and a 
willingness to preempt threats before they emerge. Most importantly, the second Bush 
administration has explicitly declared the spread of freedom to be the central principle 
of American policy… [T]he president offered its most succinct formulation: the 
defense of freedom requires the advance of freedom.”40 
“Now, the United States is alone in the world,”41 mused the dean of the realist 
school of international politics, Kenneth N. Waltz, in 2000, and realist “theory 
predicts that balances disrupted will one day be restored.”42 Why so? Waltz believed 
“As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power.”43 
Hence, “some states try to increase their own strength or they ally with others to bring 
the international distribution of power into balance.”44 Such are the age-old dynamics 
of the state system. 
2.4 The Impact of Global Governance 
Global governance means that through various structures and processes, actors 
can coordinate their interests and needs although there is no unifying political 
authority. Acknowledgment of globalizing issues and their attributes has led some 
scholars and pundits to conclude that governance processes need to be conceptualized 
differently than they have been in the past. The processes of interaction among the 
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various actors in international politics are now more frequent and intense, ranging 
from conventional ad hoc cooperation and formal organizational collaboration to non-
governmental and network collaboration. These changes have led some to think of 
there being different components of global governance. 
A global civil society is essential for the international relations puzzle to be 
whole and complete. Political scientist Ronnie Lipschutz claims that “while global 
civil society must interact with states, the code of global civil society denies the 
primacy of states or their sovereign rights. This civil society is global not only 
because of those connections that cross national boundaries and operate within the 
global, non-territorial region, but also as a result of a growing element of global 
consciousness in the way the members of global civil society act.”45 
Several liberals would find this a plausible goal to be attained while many 
would fear that global governance might undermine democratic values as the focus of 
governance moves further from individuals, democracy becomes more problematic. 
For realists, global governance does not exist in anarchy; outcomes are determined by 
relative power positions rather than law or other regulatory devices. 
As Waltz, the quintessential neo-realist, notes that “the anarchic structure of 
the international system is the core dynamic, Morgenthau acknowledges Waltz’s 
central thesis, yet he considers there is space for both international law and 
international organization.”46 Radicals are “also skeptical of global governance as a 
multi-actor, multi-process, decentralized framework, of fear of domination by 
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hegemonic powers who would structure global governance processes to their own 
advantage.”47 
2.5 The Financial Action Task Force: A Historical Background 
In the late 1980s, the problem of illegal narcotics trafficking had become of 
disturbing level and international worry. Acknowledging the extensive geographical 
spread of production activities, the global nature of drug distribution routes and drugs’ 
cross-border cash transfers, state legislation and the efforts of law enforcement bodies 
were no longer adequate. A call for an influential global action to embark upon the 
global crisis of money laundering and other misuses of the financial system as a way 
of attacking the heart of illegal narcotics trafficking and organized crime was 
adamant. 
In 1989, the G-7 countries agreed to a number of steps including measures to 
reinforce international cooperation on eradicating drug supply, including the founding 
of the Financial Action Task Force. The FATF's objective is to prevent the misuse of 
the financial system and other institutions for money laundering. More specifically, its 
mandate is to build up a global consensus on international standards to help identify, 
track and seize the illicit proceeds from drug trafficking and other crimes. 
In 1991-1992 a secretariat was set up for the FATF at the OECD. Although 
the FATF remains an independent body, the Secretariat is housed administratively at 
the OECD. In addition, the FATF is not a formal international organization. Rather, it 
is a task force comprising member governments who agree to its finance on 
provisional basis with definite objectives and a mandate that was recently approved 
authorizing the FATF to carry on functioning until 2020. 
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The FATF has 34 member jurisdictions and two regional organizations (the 
Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Commission). There are also 27 
international and regional organizations which are Associate Members or Observers 
of the FATF and participate in its work. The FATF has also encouraged the founding 
of FATF Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) to work on its goals starting in the early 
nineties. In that regard, eight FSRBs were established. Regional organizations provide 
a regular forum for working relationships among governments and actors at multiple 
levels. 
“Apart from their geographic proximity, the reach and influence of regional 
organizations depend foremost on their mandates and, secondly, on the 
resources at their disposal. It is essential to realize that not all regional 
organizations are created alike. The budgets of FSRBs are smaller than the 
FATF and, at times, grossly inadequate for the activities to be undertaken. 
Thus, the organization is only as strong as its member states’ commitment and 
willingness to fund its institutions.”48 
 
2.6 Setting International AML/CFT Standards 
In April 1990, the FATF issued its 40 Recommendations on Combating Money 
Laundering as a set of international standards intended to identify and prevent money 
laundering that laid out an extensive set of measures on criminal legal system and law 
enforcement, financial system and its regulation, and international co-operation. 
Although non-binding tools under international law, the recommendations alongside 
other FATF processes and mechanisms, had been proven successful in pressuring all 
countries to pledge political commitment to implement them with some flexibility in 
adapting them to their own legal systems and needs. The FATF engaged its members 
to detect and prevent the misuse of the international financial system by terrorists in 
response to UN Resolution 1373 and its committee. 
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The FATF set up a methodology to assess compliance with the 
recommendations in addition to best practices papers for financial institutions on 
freezing of assets as well as the development of more specific guidelines for the 
supervision of non-profit organizations and monitoring of informal value-transfer 
systems such as the Islamic practice of Hawala. The similarity of issues necessitate 
that compliance with the FATF recommendations would also reverberate compliance 
with the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC) standards. The FATF conducts (Typology Exercises) to identify emerging 
trends in money laundering and terrorist financing; re-evaluating the significance of 
its recommendations, and setting new grounds for combating terrorism by altering the 
environment of terrorist groups and making their present knowledge and capabilities 
obsolete. 
2.7 Monitoring Compliance with AML/CFT Standards 
As a policy-setting intergovernmental body, the FATF strives for a broad 
political will and action necessary to induce national, legislative and regulatory 
adjustments to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. The center of the 
FATF strategy is the Know-Your-Customer (KYC) approach that includes: 
“eliminating anonymous accounts, identifying all customers, maintaining records of 
transactions for at least five years while making all records available to legal and law 
enforcement authorities upon request, and notifying proper authorities if unusual or 
suspicious transactions have transpired.”49 The FATF also recommends that states 
“Criminalize money laundering, expand the requisite predicate act beyond 
drug related crimes to other serious crimes, and lower the threshold of 
reporting to include negligence and willful blindness, as well as to identify, 
trace, and confiscate laundered money.”50 
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The FATF has three mechanisms to assess compliance with the 
recommendations: the self-assessment routine, the mutual evaluation review and the 
Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) list. The self-assessment 
exercises and peer review processes require that each member state submits a report 
specifying its measures to comply with the recommendations followed by an 
evaluation process that is usually conducted by a peer government to assess the 
overall progress of the member state. Monitoring and assessment reviews are 
fundamental to the FATF’s success. As a pre-requisite to membership, FATF 
members participate in the first two processes, i.e. the annual self-assessment 
exercises and mutual evaluations. The two processes examine progress by neutrally 
assessing all countries against the recommendations, identifying deficiencies, and 
ensuring appropriate consequences for countries and institutions that fail to comply 
with the recommendations.  
In the self-assessment exercise, member countries provide statistical data on 
the general situation of implementation of the recommendations by means of a 
standard questionnaire to be completed by each member then analyzed and published 
by the FATF in its annual report. As noted earlier, “mutual evaluations are the 
foundation of the assessment process during which, a team of selected experts from 
legal, financial, and law enforcement fields of FATF member states assesses each 
country during an on-site examination and issues a report based on its examination. 
The report provides a comprehensive and objective assessment and highlights those 
areas in which further progress may still be required. The merits and capacities of 
states in providing regime-relevant information boost peer reporting, and so enhance 
the overall effectiveness of the reporting system. Peer review is used not only as a 
method to emphasize certain deficiencies of a state’s AML/CFT regime, but also as a 
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technique to build capacity through the detection of areas in need of technical 
assistance.”51 
As soon as a member state is deemed non-compliant, the FATF initiates a 
four-step counter-measure program that includes: first, “the non-compliant country is 
required to submit a general report to the FATF plenary meeting. Second, if further 
measures are required, the FATF president will then send a letter or a high-level 
mission to the country. Third, the FATF can issue a public statement requiring 
international financial institutions to pay special attention to transactions from that 
particular country, its citizens, and businesses. The last measure would be revoking 
membership status.”52 As for non-member states, the FATF employs a (naming and 
shaming) mechanism making public a NCCT list of countries with serious systemic 
problems. 
2.8 Naming and Shaming 
Starting in 2000, the NCCT process was intended to identify major 
deficiencies in a jurisdiction’s anti-money laundering regime where listed entries 
would be subjected to counter-measures, such as increased scrutiny by financial 
institutions. In addition, the NCCT list required that “financial institutions increase 
scrutiny to individuals, entities, or banks in listed countries or territories with what the 
FATF has considered inadequate anti-money laundering and counterterrorist 
financing infrastructure.”53 
According to FATF,  
 
“jurisdictions are considered high-risk and non-cooperative when they have 
adverse regulations and practices in place that impede international 
cooperation in the global fight against money laundering and terrorism 
financing. Consequently, the NCCT process intended to reduce exposure of 
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financial systems by distinguishing countries and territories that fail to comply 
with the recommendations, to adopt and implement sufficient measures for the 
prevention, detection and fining of money laundering crime. In that regard, the 
FATF’s counter-measures that have been enacted against NCCTs range from 
requiring member states to be more alert of NCCT business transactions to 
prohibiting any financial transactions with NCCTs.”54 
 
Hence, from 2000 to 2006, twenty-three jurisdictions were listed due to the 
lack of an effective AML/CFT regime. The informality of the NCCT tool has allowed 
for an extra flexible and agile response in all jurisdictions that had been identified as 
NCCTs in 2000 and 2001 with significant progress. The last jurisdiction was de-listed 
in October 2006. There is no specific criterion that pinpoints a particular jurisdiction’s 
level of cooperation; rather, each state is assessed for the overall, total efficiency of its 
AML/CFT laws and regulations in shutting wrongdoers away from the financial 
sector or state’s bureaucracy impeding international cooperation. 
Owing to the absence of defined modus operandi, the rules followed do not 
attend to the method of determining which countries to evaluate next or how to be 
removed from the NCCT list. Also, the nature and size of financial centers are critical 
factors, although what this exactly means is not detailed in the assessments. At most, 
“the evaluations look at four broad areas: vagueness in financial regulations, 
impediments by other regulatory policies, barriers to international cooperation, and 
insufficient resources to prevent and detect money laundering.”55 
If a jurisdiction fails to remedy deficiencies, then, “under Recommendation 
21, the FATF requires that financial institutions identify clients whose financial 
transactions originated or passed through a NCCT. The point is to make it difficult for 
individuals and entities established in the NCCT entry to the international financial 
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system. While collective action is optimal, FATF member states are free to choose 
whether or not to impose sanctions.”56 
Throughout the NCCT life, only two countries, which have relatively small 
economies and meek international relations, have been sanctioned by the FATF. “In 
December 2001, the FATF imposed a financial quarantine against Nauru, a listed 
country that had failed to adequately place money laundering controls on its large 
offshore financial sector, and applied similar countermeasures against Myanmar in 
November 2003.”57 As a sign of progress, “the FATF revoked the counter-measures 
against Nauru and Myanmar, although the countries remained on the NCCT list until 
October 2005 and October 2006, respectively.”58 The FATF utilizes a carrot and stick 
policy by means of constructive incentives by partnering with organizations, such as 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Counter-Terrorism Action 
Group to assess the countries with serious systematic problems and those that are in 
need for technical assistance, and match these needs with the donor community. 
2.9 – The International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) Process 
The NCCT process’s future success was in question, denoting a stern 
disjuncture between the NCCT and updated recommendations pertaining to the 
assessment of counter-financing of terrorism. Apparently the NCCT’s enthusiasm has 
diminished since the terrorist attacks on the US soil; while interpretations as to the 
rationale for this powerlessness included diminished notice from the US -- the driving 
force behind the FATF. 
Due to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the US 
strategy to combat terrorist financing has been spread to a few agencies, 
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unintentionally affecting the FATF. In the end, the NCCT program was transferred to 
the purview of the IMF and WB whose officials have aspired to focus on capacity 
building rather than the FATF’s ill-fated naming and shaming mechanism. 
In response to Resolution 1617, the FATF established a common methodology 
in 2004 to assess the level of implementation of its recommendations. The 
collaboration of both the IMF and WB depicts a decisive universal component to the 
FATF through increased peer pressure, transparency, and accountability. This 
departure to a more global stance, however, must be tampered with strengthening of 
FATF mandate and pondered against geographic equilibrium and organizational 
efficiency. 
Starting in 2007, the International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) 
monitored high-risk jurisdictions and recommended specific actions to deal with 
identified risks. In 2008 and 2009, “the FATF issued successive Public Statements 
concerning major deficiencies in the anti-money laundering and counter-financing of 
terrorism regimes of a number of countries including North Korea and Iran calling 
upon and urging all members to safeguard their financial sectors against money 
laundering and terrorist financing threats emanating from both North Korea and 
Iran.”59 “In 2009, the G-20 called upon the FATF to revive its process for assessing 
countries’ compliance with international AML/CFT standards and to publicly identify 
high-risk areas by February 2010. This urge reinforced the review process previously 
ongoing within the FATF and to the latter adopting in June 2009 of new ICRG 
procedures.”60 
Primal referral to the ICRG is based on the outcomes of the jurisdiction’s 
mutual evaluation report. Eventually, 
                                                             
59 FATF Public Statement, High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions, Rome, 22 June 2012  see at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org  
60 Ibid. 
37 
 
“A jurisdiction is referred to the ICRG for a preliminary or prima facie 
assessment when it reflects a considerable number of deficiencies. The 
primary appraisal that is usually conducted by one of four Regional Review 
Groups (RRGs), namely the Africa/Middle East, Americas, Asia/Pacific, and 
Europe/Eurasia, includes outreach to the jurisdiction, with the chance to 
comment on the draft prima facie report. As a result, the FATF decides 
whether it should conduct a more in-depth review of the jurisdiction’s 
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, including developing an action plan to deal 
with those deficiencies.”61 
 
Based on the ICRG process’ outcomes, the FATF issued two public statements 
in February 2010, that were later updated in June and October 2010 and February 
2011, reaffirming the FATF’s February 2009 statement that called on its members and 
other jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures to guard their financial sectors 
from risks emanating from Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
Whereas situation differs in each jurisdiction and each shows different levels of risks; 
however, “the FATF will continue to work with the jurisdictions during the 
implementation of their action plans until satisfactory progress has been achieved and 
both can be removed from public identification.”62 
2.10 Challenges Ahead 
Since money laundering and terrorist financing are two faces of the same coin, 
counter-terrorist financing can draw from the FATF experience in combating money 
laundering. The success of FATF makes it an ideal candidate in the fight against 
terrorist financing by setting coordination points and providing quick responses, 
through active monitoring of compliance and international cooperation, and enhanced 
compliance with global standards. 
As noted above, the FATF, through its mutual evaluation reviews, graduated 
peer pressure on non-complying members and the ICRG process for non-member 
                                                             
61 Ibid. 
62 Gardner, Kathryn L., “Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way,” Global Governance, July-Sept 2007 Issue 
see at http://www.rienner.com/uploads/49933a6177586.pdf 
38 
 
states, increases the reliability of states’ commitment to comply with anti-money 
laundering and counter-financing of terrorism global standards. By targeting financial 
resources, counter-terrorism policies have a big chance to be realized in fighting 
international terrorism. 
So, is the FATF up to the task? Assessing the FATF’s success is a daunting 
task as it is inconvenient to ascertain whether member states are complying with the 
FATF recommendations because of their obligation or for other motivations. 
Moreover, the FATF does not set equivalent weight to recommendations or a 
definition of what overall compliance means. 
“Such imprecision and open-endedness can bind efforts to full compliance 
because member states may be uncertain of what sort of action is required or 
otherwise unwilling to move beyond the minimum. One more difficulty rests 
in how the organization appraises compliance. As is clear through its 
evaluation process, the level of compliance is the extent to which national 
rules reflect the FATF recommendations. However, this appraisal is 
incomplete since it does not attain to the country’s prosecutorial or penalizing 
rates, a tough to call criterion.”63 
 
An effective AML/CFT system, in general, is important for addressing 
terrorist financing, and most measures previously focused on terrorist financing are 
now integrated throughout the FATF recommendations, therefore obviating the need 
for Special Recommendations. However, there are some recommendations that are 
unique to terrorist financing: Recommendation 5 (Criminalization of terrorist 
financing); Recommendation 6 (Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & 
terrorist financing); and Recommendation 8 (Measures to prevent the misuse of non-
profit organizations). And, in 2008 the FATF’s mandate was expanded to include 
dealing with the financing of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) 
while adopting a new Recommendation 7 aimed at ensuring consistent and effective 
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implementation of targeted financial sanctions when these are called for by the UN 
Security Council. 
To conclude, the FATF Methodology encompasses a four-scale category for 
rating the level of compliance. These are: compliant, largely compliant, partially 
compliant, and non-compliant. The mutual evaluation routine involves three main 
criteria that deal with nature of deficiency detected and related response: first, 
identification of the type of deficiency whether it is discrete or not, or if it is systemic 
or not; second, the recognition of the need for a response; and last, assessing the 
quality of the response, that is, whether the response correctly addresses the problem 
and whether the time allocated to address the deficiency is reasonable. 
A shortcoming in the methodology is its lack of precision in definitions. Still, 
that same vagueness is what allows the FATF flexibility and irregularity in 
responding to specific needs and conditions of each and every state. The self-
assessment exercise and mutual evaluation reviews indicate that while member states 
have a higher level of compliance than non-member states, the FATF still encounter 
non-compliance with the Nine Special Recommendations on terrorist financing from 
member-states. 
The ills of crime and terrorism are significant and can be seen as occurring at 
three levels – individual and local, community and regional, and national and 
international. At the individual and local level, the use of commodities or services 
controlled by criminals has a negative impact on individuals in terms of health, 
personal wealth and quality of life since young people are more drawn into crime by 
easy money, power or sense of affiliation. In recent decades, both criminals and 
terrorists have committed and sponsored kidnapping, and used violence and 
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intimidation to coerce innocent individuals into facilitating crime and to achieve 
political or military objectives. 
At the community and regional level, there is damage to the reputations of 
areas in which illegal activity is prevalent and financial losses to legitimate businesses 
due to being the victims of crime and terrorism. In addition, terrorist attacks also 
devastate the targeted local areas. The long-term effect of these activities serves to 
undermine public confidence in law enforcement and the wider criminal justice 
system. 
Finally, at the national and international level, the global reach of organized 
crime and terrorism has weakened economies, damaged social fabric, corrupted, and 
caused or exacerbated the failure of states that suffer from reputational and financial 
impact on their institutions and economies. 
In summary, following the ending of the third round of mutual evaluations of 
its members, the FATF, in close co-operation with the FATF-Style Regional Bodies 
(FSRBs) and the observer organizations, including the IMF, the WB and the UN, has 
reviewed and updated its recommendations. The revised recommendations address 
new and emerging threats, clarify and strengthen many of the existing obligations 
while maintaining the necessary stability and rigor, and reinforce the requirements for 
implementation of a Risk-Based Approach (RBA) which entails that countries should 
first identify, assess and understand the risks of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, and then adopt appropriate measures to mitigate the risks. The Risk-Based 
Approach allows countries to target their resources more effectively and apply 
preventive measures that are commensurate to the nature of risks, in order to focus 
and utilize their efforts and resources more efficiently. 
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Not only the FATF is committed to maintaining a close and constructive 
dialogue with the private sector, civil society and parties, as important partners in 
ensuring the integrity of the international financial system; but it also calls upon all 
countries to implement effective measures to bring their national AML/CFT systems 
into compliance with the revised FATF Recommendations. 
Why then fear the OFAC List? In response to September 11 terrorist attacks, 
US Congress passed the PATRIOT Act. Title III of the PATRIOT Act is the 
International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 
2001. It is arguably the single most significant AML law that Congress has enacted 
since the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act commonly known as the 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) itself. 
Among other things, the PATRIOT Act criminalized the financing of 
terrorism and augmented the existing BSA framework by strengthening customer 
identification procedures; prohibiting financial institutions from engaging in business 
with foreign shell banks; requiring financial institutions to have due diligence 
procedures and, in some cases, enhanced due diligence procedures for foreign 
correspondent and private banking accounts; and improving information sharing 
between financial institutions and the US government. We now turn to the next 
chapter that will discuss extensively terrorism, foreign policy, and US money 
laundering laws.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 US FOREIGN POLICY & MONEY LAUNDERING 
LAWS 
 
This chapter will focus on US international politics, highlighting money 
laundering laws and laying the groundwork for how this impacts the international 
standards and ultimately similar laws and policies in Lebanon. On October 26, 2001, 
President George W. Bush signed the most far-reaching law enacted in the United 
States since the New Deal legislation of Franklin Roosevelt’s time. The USA Patriot 
Act of 2001 bolsters the potency of the money laundering laws and Bank Secrecy Act 
to levels unseen since they were enacted in 1986 and 1970 respectively. Encouraged 
by the strong congressional desire to close the avenues of terrorist financing, the laws 
now reach levels of coverage and scope that would not have been possible had it not 
been for the events of 9/11. The Patriot Act had left no part of the world or financial 
institution or business anywhere beyond the reach of the United States government. 
3.1 Background 
Settling into the White House in 1993, Bill Clinton had undeniably inherited a 
shiny new world. It was more permissive than any other encountered by an American 
president in the twentieth century. And American power, no longer trammeled by the 
Soviet Union, stood at its historical apex. 
“Because we remain the world’s indispensible nation,” Clinton intoned in 
1996, “we must act and we must lead.”64 This was the mantra of a presidency 
sitting on top of the world. “If the United States does not lead, the job will not 
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be done… Our leadership is essential…. American leadership is 
indispensible… We have to assume the burden of leadership.”65 
Then came 9/11, and exuberance changed into fear and fury. At least in terms 
of U.S. grand strategy, nothing would ever be the same again, as the phrase of the day 
had it. What had changed? On September the 11
th
, “enemies of freedom committed an 
act of war against our country,”66 President Bush intoned. “Americans have known 
wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil. … Americans 
have known the causalities of war – but not at the center of a great city. … Americans 
have known surprise attacks – but never before on thousands of civilians.”67 
Henceforth, the shock of 9/11 – a vulnerability America had never experienced – 
would course through the corridors of American power. 
The United States has often opted for a one-sided approach in foreign policy; 
yet in the war against terrorism it has followed a global approach. Foreign policy is 
often identified as an element of domestic policy. Kenneth Waltz, for example, 
highlights the similarity of foreign policy behavior amongst states with diverse 
political orders, and argues that “if any state was to become a model for the rest of the 
world, one would have to conclude that most of the impetus behind foreign policy is 
internally generated.”68 
U.S. foreign policy has proven inconsistent in the last decade mainly due to 
inside changes as well as in the international system. Foreign policy decision-makers 
operate within the confines of the international system. In War and Change in World 
Politics, Robert Gilpin (1987) observes another form of system change: “where states 
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act to preserve their own welfare and thereby change the international system. Such 
changes can occur because states react differently to political, economic, and 
technological developments.”69 Gilpin finds that “the distribution of power among 
states constitutes the principal form of control in every international system.”70 
Accepting the realist assumptions that states are the principal actors, decision-makers 
are basically rational, and the international system structure plays a key role in 
determining power, Gilpin adds the notion of dynamism, of history as a series of 
cycles of birth, expansion, and demise of dominant powers on the basis of the 
importance of economic power. 
While liberal internationalists such as Fukuyama who claims that “the 
projection of liberal-democratic principles to the international realm is said to provide 
the best prospect for a peaceful world order because a world made up of liberal 
democracies… should have much less incentive for war, since all nations would 
reciprocally recognize one another’s legitimacy;”71 neo-realists emphasize system 
structure and balance of power. Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that “the moral 
aspirations of states are thwarted by the absence of an overarching authority which 
regulates their behavior towards each other. The anarchical nature of the international 
system homogenizes foreign policy behavior by socializing states into the system of 
power politics. The requirements of strategic power and security are paramount in an 
insecure world, and they soon override the ethical pursuits of states, regardless of 
their domestic political complexions.”72 
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Responding to the 9/11 attacks, the United States declared war on terrorism 
and that a situation of armed conflict exists (Public Law No. 107-40). When the U.N. 
General Assembly invoked Article 51 of its Charter, it agreed to the U.S. response for 
authorization for the use military power as based on the right of self-defense. In this 
regard, the General Assembly determined that acts of terrorism represented an armed 
assault. President Bush has constantly referred to the situation as one of war. 
3.2 U.S. Money Laundering Laws 
There’s no better way to describe the dramatic global impact of the United 
States money laundering laws than by ascribing to them the traits of those who share 
October birthdays. The most significant of those laws would be Scorpios – a sign 
described as strong and self-reliant with a deep inner sense of authority and power. 
For better or worse, these attributes describe the U.S. money laundering law and the 
USA Patriot Act. 
Congress took action against money laundering on October 26, 1970 when it 
passed the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), a law directing the U.S. Treasury Department to 
create regulations requiring financial institutions to report large cash transactions. 
Sixteen years and a day later, former President Ronald Reagan created the nation’s 
first money laundering laws with the stroke of a pen when he signed the Money 
Laundering Control Act into law on October 27, 1986. Fifteen additional years later, 
President George W. Bush signed the USA Patriot Act into law on October 26, 2001, 
just 45 days after 9/11. It gave rise to many bold regulations that are felt by thousands 
of institutions and individuals all over the world. It also strengthened the money 
laundering law by increasing its power over persons and institutions who handle 
foreign corruption proceeds. 
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The United States was the first nation to criminalize money laundering 
through a laundering law that relates to the proceeds of a wide range of crimes (Title 
18, U.S. Code Sec. 1956) and imposes penalties of up to 20 years in prison. It also 
includes an exclusive provision that prohibits financial transactions concerning the 
proceeds of, or for the purpose of promoting, nearly 200 Specified Unlawful 
Activities (SUAs), which are crimes that generate profit such as terrorism, 
government procurement fraud, bank fraud, espionage, kidnapping, narcotics offenses 
and others, including certain foreign crimes (Title 18, USC Sec. 1956(c) (7)). 
The Monetary Transaction crime, an additional federal criminal money 
laundering law which has minor penalties (Title 18, USC Sec. 1957), makes it a crime 
for anyone to knowingly engage in a monetary transaction, such as a deposit or 
transfer of cash or purchase of a monetary instrument, involving property of $10,000 
or more… derived from specified unlawful activity, which is defined by incorporating 
the list of SUAs listed in the accompanying stronger money laundering law at section 
1956. The third money laundering law makes it a crime to manage an unlicensed 
money transmitting businesses even where the person did not know it was a crime to 
run such a company in the state where it is incorporated (Title 18, USC Sec. 1960). 
3.2.1 The Kerry Amendment 
In the mid-1980s, then U.S. Democratic Senator John Kerry had been 
extensively involved in investigation into money laundering by the notorious Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). In 1988, he authored the first U.S. law, 
called the Kerry Amendment, to impose sanctions on countries that do not cooperate 
with U.S. anti-money laundering (AML) efforts. “We find ourselves in a position 
where we are compelled by the globalization of crime to globalize law and law 
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enforcement, Kerry wrote in his 1997 book, The New War: the Web of Crime That 
Threatens Society.”73 
The Kerry Amendment to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 preceded the 
FATF’s and OECD’s efforts to black-list non-compliant countries. The amendment 
called for the Department of Treasury to negotiate information-sharing agreements 
with foreign countries covering money laundering cases and currency transactions 
over $10,000. Individuals and banks that did not share information could be barred 
from the U.S. wire transfer and dollar clearing systems or prohibited from opening 
U.S. accounts. Hereafter, the Treasury Department criticized the measure, according 
to a 1990 Treasury statement; it said many countries will resist being pressured into 
bilateral agreements conceived unilaterally by the U.S. 
In 1992 Kerry and Colorado Republican Senator Hank Brown issued a Senate 
committee report on their investigation, The BCCI Affair, which was also known as 
the Kerry Report. The 785-page report’s first recommendation was that “the U.S. 
should take firm action against nations who permit their privacy and confidentiality 
laws to protect criminals from U.S. regulators and law enforcement. Current toleration 
by the U.S. of bank secrecy and regulatory havens needs to be replaced by a policy 
that threatens to withhold access to the U.S. market for banks doing business in any 
nation that does not meet minimum standards for regulation and the sharing of 
information with the U.S.”74 
Months before 9/11, Kerry sponsored the International Counter-Money 
Laundering and Foreign Corruption Act, which would have authorized Treasury to 
require financial institutions to file suspicious activity reports on transactions 
involving any person or jurisdiction deemed a primary money laundering concern. 
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Financial institutions would have been required to identify the owner of any account 
opened or maintained by a foreign person. The bill which did not pass was criticized 
for giving Treasury too much power. After 9/11, however, Kerry was a major player 
in getting these provisions incorporated into the USA Patriot Act. 
3.3 The USA Patriot Act 
U.S. President George W. Bush has made his mark in the world of money 
laundering and terrorist financing – whether by choice or circumstance, however, 
remains an open question. Once in office, the Bush administration withdrew U.S. 
support for the multinational Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s efforts to sanction offshore laundering havens. It also contemplated a 
regulatory overhaul to ease the burden of current compliance requirements on 
financial institutions, and paid little attention to the fact that the U.S. ranked 26
th
 of 29 
countries in its adherence to the FATF’s 40 Recommendations. 
Then came 9/11, and the Bush administration made a 180-degree turn 
concerning terrorism financing and money laundering. Under pressure from the White 
House, the USA Patriot Act became law on October 26, 2001. The USA Patriot Act 
(Public Law No. 107-56) reinforced the influence of the money laundering laws and 
Bank Secrecy Act to unprecedented ranks since they were enacted in 1986 and 1970 
respectively. The Bank Secrecy Act was amended more than 50 times, and three 
money laundering laws and the forfeiture laws were strengthened above all in their 
outreach that would not have been possible had it not been for the events of 9/11. 
The Patriot Act re-defined international acts of terrorism so as to incorporate 
activities of mass destruction intended to influence the behavior of government. It 
defined domestic terrorism to include activities that occur primarily on U.S. soil. This 
law has left no part of the globe or financial institution or business anywhere beyond 
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the reach of the U.S. government. It also altered the features of the money laundering 
field forever as is evident from the AML Program requirements that would include 
internal policies, procedures, and controls, designation of a compliance officer, setting 
employee training programs, and performing independent audit functions to test 
programs. 
The Patriot Act covers a wide range of money laundering and terrorism 
financing issues. Amongst its requirements, and the most far-reaching, is the one that 
authorizes the Treasury to stipulate special measures that financial institutions have to 
pursue in their business with private banking accounts, correspondent accounts and 
countries at any time the Treasury resolves to. The statute’s vast provisions calling for 
record keeping and other reports have been condemned as imposing sharp costs as 
well as serious restraints on sovereignty and freedom of expression. 
The Patriot Act modified the civil penalty section of the money laundering law 
(Title 18, USC Sec. 1956 (b)) to permit for civil lawsuits for violation of the second 
money laundering law that prohibits money transactions in property derived from 
specified unlawful activity (Title 18, USC Sec. 1957) allowing prosecutors to exact 
monetary fines from individuals and businesses that deliberately partake in monetary 
transactions without having to set up the more complex objectives and intentionality 
that the laundering law requires (Title 18, USC Sec. 1956 (a)). 
3.3.1 A Deluge of Regulations 
The regulations spawned by the USA Patriot Act, which are codified in Title 
31 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part III, have turned the money 
laundering control world on its head. Of the Patriot Act’s eleven titles, Title III was 
devoted exclusively to terrorist financing, Bank Secrecy Act and money laundering 
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subjects. Listed below is a briefing of the most revolutionary Patriot Act provisions 
and their impact: 
i. Section 311 (Special Measures) authorizes the U.S. Treasury to designate 
countries, individuals or institutions as primary money laundering concerns 
and to impose special measures against them. 
 
ii. Section 312 (Due Diligence for Correspondent & Private Banking Accounts) 
is the most controversial and far reaching provision of the Act. Section 312 
puts tens of thousands of non-United States financial institutions and 
wealthy persons who are correspondent and private banking customers of 
U.S. banks, securities dealers and mutual funds under greater scrutiny 
through special due diligence the U.S. institutions must exercise. 
 
iii. Section 313 (Prohibition on US Accounts with Foreign Shell Banks 
Accounts) as companion to Section 312, prohibits foreign shell banks – 
those without a physical presence – from maintaining correspondent 
accounts at U.S. financial institutions. It also requires covered U.S. 
institutions to take reasonable steps to ensure that a foreign correspondent 
account is not being used to provide banking services indirectly to a shell 
bank. Sometimes called nesting, this refers to the ability of one foreign bank 
to use another foreign bank’s correspondent accounts. 
 
iv. Sections 314(a) and (b) (Cooperative Efforts to Deter Money Laundering) 
opened unprecedented routes for U.S. financial institutions to share with 
U.S. law enforcement agencies and other institutions customer information 
of possible terrorist or money laundering activities. Section 314(a) allows 
federal enforcement agencies, through FinCEN, to request, without 
subpoena or legal process that financial institutions search their accounts and 
review transactions of named individuals or organizations suspected of 
money laundering or terrorist financing. 
 
Section 314(b) allows financial institutions that must maintain AML 
programs to exchange with such institutions customer information if money 
laundering or terrorist financing are suspected. For these exchanges, which 
require a notice to Treasury, Congress lifted the obligations of the financial 
privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Law. 
 
v. Section 319 targets funds in US interbank accounts and bank records. Now 
codified as part of the U.S. forfeiture law (Title 18, U.S. Code Section 
981(k)), it is one of the most aggressive money laundering-related 
enactments under the Patriot Act. It raises significant risks for international 
banks by allowing U.S. prosecutors, with federal court approval, to seize 
funds in a foreign bank’s U.S. inter-bank account equivalent to the funds 
held by the foreign bank’s targeted customer in the overseas institution. The 
DOJ does not acknowledge or reveal the true number of foreign banks’ 
seized accounts. 
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vi. Section 326 (Verification of Identification) requires banks, broker dealers 
and certain others to maintain a four-pronged, risk-based customer 
identification program that, among other things must be approved by the 
board of directors and form a part of the AML program. 
 
vii. Section 352 (Anti-Money Laundering Programs) requires industries and 
businesses that are classified as financial institutions under the BSA to 
maintain a four-pronged, risk-based AML program (Title 31, USC Section 
5312(a)(2)), unless Treasury exempts them. The AML program must include 
board-approved written policies and procedures, designation of a compliance 
officer, continual employee training, and independent testing of the program. 
 
In addition to strengthening requirements of the BSA, the new AML 
provisions are clearly focused on dealing with perceived gaps in regulation of 
correspondent banking and private banking accounts. Provisions codify industry best 
practices in terms of adequate controls relative to verification of customer identity – 
including upfront list checking, a detailed understanding of customer business, 
business partners, and source of funds – as well as ongoing monitoring of high-risk 
accounts. The inclusion of anti-terrorist considerations into money laundering 
prevention regulations marries OFAC-type list access with ongoing analyses of the 
sources and usage of funds. Enhanced scrutiny of accounts and transaction activity 
extends the need for inclusive or enterprise-wide anti-money laundering systems, a 
greater know-your-customer insight relative to account ownership and usage, and a 
more forensic approach to identification and analysis of potentially suspicious 
transaction activity. 
The Act employs the carrot-and-stick approach to foreign entities; on the one 
hand seeking assistance of foreign governments and financial institutions to combat 
terrorism and money laundering, and on the other, instituting long-arm jurisdiction 
and other controls over foreign bank funds, primarily through U.S. correspondent 
accounts and interbank accounts by means of its extraterritorial reach provisions. 
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3.3.2 Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Money Laundering Law 
The U.S. money laundering law includes an extraterritorial reach if the offense 
is committed by a U.S. citizen or by a foreign national who conducts at least part of 
the offense in the U.S., and if the transaction entails more than $10,000. The law 
contains several provisions that extend its prohibitions and powerful sanctions into 
foreign countries and institutions, businesses and individuals. Extraterritorial 
jurisdictions of the primary U.S. money laundering law can relate to a financial 
transaction that occurs in whole or part in the U.S. if the funds involved were 
resulting from purely overseas crimes that incorporate drug trafficking, extortion, 
foreign corruption, fraud against a foreign bank, kidnapping, robbery, or destruction 
of property by explosion or fire (Title 18, USC Sec. 1956(I)). 
One of the three prongs of the money laundering law deals entirely with the 
international transportation, transmissions or transfers, from or to the United States, of 
funds if processed with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful 
activity, or with knowledge that the funds are from some form of unlawful activity to 
conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the funds or 
avoid a federal or state transaction reporting requirement. 
3.3.3 Civil Money Laundering Lawsuits by the U.S. Government 
In addition to its heavy criminal penalties of up to five years in prison, the law 
permits for civil penalty lawsuits by the government for the value of the funds or 
property involved in the transaction. The civil penalty clause was significantly 
bolstered by the Patriot Act, making it now permissible to assign a federal receiver to 
collect and take possession of the assets of a foreign person or entity who is facing a 
money laundering civil suit by the U.S. government (Title 18, USC Sec. 1956(b)). 
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The U.S. Department of Justice has the exclusive power under the money 
laundering law to follow civil lawsuits against financial institutions, 
businesses and persons even though they are not charged with the crime of 
money laundering on the basis of allegations that they laundered money. In the 
case of an institution, the lawsuits seek recovery of the amount of money 
laundered through the institution by its employees (Title 18, USC Sec. 
1956(b)). 
 
3.4 Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Implementation Act 
On September 24, 2001 the President signed into law a broad Executive Order 
(EO) 13224 blocking the assets of, and prohibiting dealings with, 27 persons and 
entities alleged to be terrorists or fronts, including Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda 
group (Title 50, USC Section 1702). That meant closing the door to U.S. financial 
system and dollar clearance services and seizure of accounts of foreign accomplice 
financial institutions, including their correspondent accounts at U.S. banks. 
The Order also empowered Treasury to impose financial sanctions on terrorist-
related entities worldwide that it deemed as Specially Designated Global Terrorists 
(SDGT). The Treasury Department has the power under the President’s Order to deny 
any advantage to foreign financial institutions in their transactions with U.S. banks. 
That includes, among other provisions, the maintenance of correspondent accounts. It 
allows the Secretary to re-delegate any of these functions to other U.S. agencies, 
including FinCEN, Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). 
Title III of the Patriot Act amended existing anti-money laundering provisions 
of the BSA to endorse prevention, detection, and trial of international money 
laundering and terrorist financing. The USA Patriot Act increased the power of 
Treasury and other federal agencies and departments to combat money laundering and 
terrorism by providing them with more control over, and information from, financial 
institutions. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity 
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Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) are added to the list of functional industry 
regulators under the BSA, which includes the Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and the Credit Union National 
Association (CUNA). 
3.4.1 Agency Shake-Up 
Treasury’s Terrorist Financial Asset Tracking Center became operational right 
after September 11, even though it had been funded since October 2000. But the new 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003 took on much of Treasury’s 
AML and counter-terrorist financing workforce, including U.S. Customs Service 
agents at Operation Green Quest who had been given a mandate to investigate 
terrorist financing cases, and the Secret Service. In the meantime, the FBI had already 
established a Terrorism Financing Operation Section (TFOS), which conducts 
financial analysis of terrorism suspects and coordinates the sharing of information 
between government and intelligence agencies. The FBI also launched the Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), often composed of FBI agents, IRS-CID (Criminal 
Investigation Division) agents and local police, which investigate terrorism financing 
crimes across the United States. 
The Department of Homeland Security had access to information gathered by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and 
other agencies. All have a financial component that includes IRS-CID agents and 
local police. The agents also enjoy access to all financial databases of the U.S. 
government, including the Treasury Department’s Currency Banking Retrieval 
System (CBRS), which contains all the forms filed under the Bank Secrecy Act. The 
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CBRS provides access to millions of forms filed reporting, among other things, 
suspicious activity, currency transactions and border currency reports. 
Subsequent tension between DHS and the FBI resulted in the FBI being given 
the lead role in terrorism financing investigations. The IRS-CID, which employs some 
of the most highly-skilled financial investigators in the world, continues to investigate 
terrorism financing cases through JTTFs. The shake-up has left three departments 
competing for much the same anti-terrorist finance funding. But the General 
Accounting Office, the congressional watchdog agency, concluded in a May 2004 
report that progress has been made in waging a coordinated campaign against sources 
of terrorist financing. 
3.4.2 The 9/11 Commission’s Report on Terrorist Financing 
The 9/11 Commission’s report on terrorist financing criticized U.S. efforts to 
freeze and seize terrorist assets following the attacks on the World Trade Center. The 
two documents substantially detail the great challenge that public and private 
institutions face in starving terrorists of their funds. 
Before 9/11, terrorist financing was not considered important enough by the 
Treasury Department to be included in the National Money Laundering Strategy, 
according to the report that was released on July 22, 2004. Treasury regulators, as 
well as U.S. financial institutions, were generally focused on finding and deterring or 
disrupting the vast flows of U.S. currency generated by drug trafficking and high-
level international fraud. Since then, “the focus has been on freezing terrorist assets 
instead of following where they might lead, and to date, the origin of the 9/11 funds – 
estimated at between $400,000 and $500,000 – remains unknown.”75 
                                                             
75 Money Laundering Alert, “9/11 reports call for following, not freezing, terror money,” (September 
2004), pp. 9 and 14. See at http://www.moneylaunderingalert.com  
56 
 
Shortly after signing Executive Order (EO) 13224, the Treasury’s Office of 
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), who relied on a derivative designation theory in 
which no direct proof of culpability was needed, blocked nearly $142 million 
worldwide in terrorist assets with the assistance of foreign governments, the 
Commission said and, as a result, some evidentiary foundations for early designations 
were quite weak. But simply freezing terrorist funding has done little to disrupt the 
flow of money, according to the main Commission’s report. “Al Qaeda had many 
other avenues of funding and if a particular source of funds dried up, it could have 
easily tapped a different source to fund an attack such as the 9/11. The Commission 
concluded that the overall or long-term effect of blocking terrorist-related assets is not 
clear.”76 
Although Treasury had been appropriated $6.4 million for an all-source 
terrorist financing intelligence analysis center called the Foreign Terrorist Asset 
Tracking Center (FTATC) in October 2000, it remained inactive until after 9/11. The 
CIA believed that the FTATC would duplicate some of its functions, as well as the 
FBI has never put to use significant financial intelligence on specific terrorist groups 
before the 9/11 attacks by developing criminal cases or disrupting lines of funding. 
“There was a fairly rigid rule within the FBI and Department of Justice against 
mingling intelligence cases and law enforcement cases. In the jargon of the day, this 
prohibition was known as the wall, the Commission said.”77 
3.4.3 The Saudi Connection 
Critics have also faulted the administration for its relationship with Saudi 
Arabia, identified as the primary source of money for Al Qaeda both before and after 
the 9/11 attacks. The Saudis did not cooperate with U.S. efforts to disrupt terrorist 
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financing until after Al Qaeda attacks on their own soil of May 12, 2003, according to 
the 9/11 Commission report. 
U.S. Senator John Kerry has voiced full support for the 9/11 Commission 
report’s recommendations which include making the tracking of terrorist financing 
front and center in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. He promised to name and shame 
terrorist financiers, sanction foreign banks that engage in money laundering, and get 
tougher on Saudi Arabia – “ending what he called the Bush administration’s kid-glove 
approach.”78 While Kerry belittled Saudi Arabia’s efforts to combat terrorist 
financing, the Financial Action Task Force 2003-2004 Annual Report stated that 
“Saudi Arabia has focused heavily on systems and measures to counter terrorism and 
the financing of terrorism, has already established systems for tracing and freezing 
terrorist assets, and is largely compliant with the FATF’s recommendations on money 
laundering and terrorist financing.”79 
3.5 Unilateralism a Liability 
AML experts agree that the war against money laundering and terrorism 
requires multinational cooperation. Some criticized the Bush administration’s 
unilateralism as an impediment to these efforts stating that foreign policy is one of the 
most important anti-money laundering tools – “being a better multilateral player and 
not being seen as interfering in the internal affairs of countries.”80 Others are even of 
the opinion that “Bush’s foreign policy has greatly exacerbated the money laundering 
and terrorist financing problems; the failure to grapple with the Israeli/Palestine crisis, 
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the pre-emptive war on Iraq, all contributed to the political capital and leadership of 
the U.S. being dramatically deteriorated.”81 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Glazer stated that “the U.S. continues to 
work with other partner financial centers to develop and maintain effective 
international standards to protect the financial system against illicit financing. 
Above all, the Treasury is promoting this strategic objective with the FATF 
through its recommendations, guidelines, and best practices for combating 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism. It also supports the 
development of relevant resolutions at the U.N. These standards assist 
countries in developing their own anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist 
financing laws and regulations.”82 
 
Since before 9/11, the U.S. Treasury has consistently engaged the FATF to 
expand its recommendations to address the systemic vulnerabilities that terrorists and 
other criminals may exploit through the development of Nine Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing and revision of the FATF 40 
Recommendations. These standard-setting efforts at FATF and U.N. levels create a 
global obligation and framework for countries to implement AML/CFT regimes that 
effectively protect the international financial system against all forms of illicit finance 
and criminal abuse. 
Major work has been closely conducted with interagency partners and 
international counterparts to establish a comprehensive global system of AML/CFT 
assessments through FATF, FSRBs, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
Through the FATF and FSRBs mutual evaluation process, Treasury has directly 
participated in the assessments of several strategically essential countries. In brief, the 
FATF identifies strengths and weaknesses in a jurisdiction’s AML/CFT regime and 
assures that deficiencies are being addressed. One potentially appropriate 
governmental response to systemic vulnerabilities created by jurisdictional AML/CFT 
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deficiencies is providing technical assistance by the Treasury to aid compliance with 
international standards in support of the broader U.S. government task in combating 
terrorist financing and to facilitate the development of transparent and accountable 
financial systems in strategic countries of concern. 
“A significant part of Treasury’s mission is devoted to U.S. government 
efforts to secure international support and implementation of targeted financial 
sanctions, actions through a variety of activities, including by maintaining a 
dialogue with other countries regarding the financial actions that are needed to 
disrupt specific terrorist cells or networks and also by working to strengthen 
other countries’ capacity and ability to implement targeted financial sanctions. 
Through the U.S. government’s efforts with the EU, the FATF, the G-7 and 
others, other countries were able to develop national sanctions authorities and 
to improve cooperation in implementing asset freezes. In many cases, 
countries have joined the U.S. in imposing sanctions on U.S.-designated 
individuals and entities, either independently or through action at the U.N. 
Security Council. This global designation program, overseen by the U.N.’s 
1267 Committee, is a powerful tool for global action against supporters of Al 
Qaeda.”83 
 
3.6 Protests to Extra-Territorial Reach of US Asset Forfeiture Law 
Heightened concerns regarding Section 319(a) of the USA Patriot Act, that 
gives the government sweeping authority to seize and forfeit money from the U.S. 
accounts of foreign banks, have prompted the European Banking Industry Committee 
(EBIC), a trade association, to address the problem in a working paper that was 
released in May 2005 re-assessing the effect and impact of the law on European banks 
that hold interbank accounts in the United States. 
Section 319(a) of the USA Patriot Act that was made part of the U.S. civil 
forfeiture law (Title 18, USC Sec. 981(k)) states in part that, “if funds are deposited 
into an account at a foreign bank and that foreign bank has an interbank account in the 
United States… the funds shall be deemed to have been deposited into the interbank 
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account.”84 That means, any seizure warrant for those funds, “may be served on the 
U.S. financial institution, and funds in the interbank account, up to the value… 
deposited into… foreign bank account, may be… seized…”85 In addition, the seized 
money need not be related to the suspected criminal funds overseas. The foreign bank 
whose funds are seized may challenge the U.S. government’s seizure under limited 
circumstances. However, the owner of the funds is welcome to challenge the U.S. 
action if he or she dares to appear in U.S. court. 
The EBIC considered adopting a regulation similar to a 1996 blocking statute 
– a response to strengthened U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba (EC No. 2271/96). 
The statute protected EU member states from the effects of extraterritorial 
applications of the Helms-Burton Act and actions resulting from it, by making the 
adherence to the economic sanctions against Cuba in that legislation illegal within the 
EU. Just the threat of such a response would force U.S. agencies to carefully consider 
applying Section 319(a), thus making actual implementation of protective legislation 
unnecessary. 
Another concern was that the provision could be used to seize the U.S. 
accounts of foreign banks for violating Office of Foreign Assets Control economic 
sanctions. OFAC sanctions apply only to U.S. persons and entities; non-U.S. 
institutions outside the U.S. are not obligated to reject business with or block assets of 
entities on OFAC blacklists. In practice, however, problems have arisen when 
overseas banks move to recover funds seized from their accounts in the United States. 
Diplomatic protests from the Swiss and other governments caused the Justice 
Department to instruct the 93 U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the nation to obtain 
approval from Main Justice in Washington D.C. before applying Section 319(a). In 
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response, the U.S. government said that it shall use the provision only when Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) fail. MLATs make it easier to obtain 
investigative assistance from other countries by allowing one country’s law 
enforcement agency to make requests to its foreign counterpart through diplomatic 
channels. But obtaining foreign legal assistance is a lengthy, time-consuming process. 
All requests must be approved by the Justice Department Office of International 
Affairs, which forwards them to its foreign counterpart, which passes them to local 
enforcement agencies. By contrast, Section 319 allows U.S. enforcement agencies to 
short-circuit the whole process. 
Moving to the next section of the thesis, it is worth mentioning that major 
progress has been made, since 9/11, in creating and deploying financial measures to 
identify, disrupt and dismantle the financial networks that facilitate and support 
terrorism. Through the adoption of UNSCRs 1267 and 1373, the U.S. has created an 
effective global framework with obligations to ensure that the international financial 
system is a hostile working environment for those who support terrorist financing. 
3.7 The United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
On September 28, 2001, the Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 1373 which requires, among other things, the freezing of terrorist assets, 
placing barriers on the movement, organization and fund-raising activities of terrorist 
groups. It recalled provisions from previous resolutions 1189 (1998), 1269 (1999) and 
1368 (2001) concerning terrorism. U.N. member states were expected to share their 
intelligence on terrorist groups in order to assist in combating international terrorism. 
Resolution 1373 calls on all states “to adjust their national laws in order to 
ratify all existing international conventions on terrorism. It affirmed that all States 
should also ensure that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offenses in 
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domestic laws and regulations and that the seriousness of such acts is duly reflected in 
sentences served.”86 
It also aims at restricting immigration laws, declaring that before granting 
refugee status, “all States should take appropriate measures to ensure that the asylum 
seekers had not planned or facilitated or participated in terrorist acts. In addition, 
States should ensure that refugee status was not abused by the perpetrators, organizers 
or facilitators of terrorist acts, and that claims of political motivation were not 
accepted as basis for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists.”87 
Unlike treaties or conventions that require subsequent steps, Security Council 
resolutions, when issued, bind all its 191 U.N. member states. The Security Council’s 
act, in placing Resolution 1373 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, signifies the 
urgency of its response. That Chapter authorized the Security Council to enforce the 
terms of a resolution by use of measures ranging from economic sanctions to the use 
of military force. Resolution 1373 requires that “states should afford one another the 
greatest measure of assistance for criminal investigations or criminal proceedings 
relating to the financing or support of terrorist acts.”88 
In effect, the Security Council established the Counter-Terrorism Committee 
(CTC) to monitor the improvement of adherence by nations to the resolution. 
However, the resolution failed to define terrorism, and the working group initially 
only added Al-Qaeda and Taliban regime of Afghanistan on the sanctions list. This 
also entailed the possibility that authoritarian regimes brand even non-violent activists 
as terrorists, and hence infringing upon basic human rights. 
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The absence of any specific reference to human rights considerations was 
remedied in part by Resolution 1456 (2003) which affirmed that “states must ensure 
that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under 
international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international 
law, in particular, international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.”89 
Apparently, a definition of terrorism was a highly complex and, probably, at 
the international level, a controversial undertaking. At the end of January 2002, U.N. 
member states debated the terrorist-definition problem. It was obvious that member 
states were distant on the issue of the meaning and legality of terrorism. Disapproval 
was expressed by the 56-member Organization of Islamic Conference to any terrorist-
definition that would not relate to the notion of freedom fighters. They rejected any 
definition that might impede national liberation movements, or resistance to foreign 
occupation. 
Founded in concerns over violations of national sovereignty because of 
foreign intervention, the political convictions of opposing states are hard to overcome. 
The international definition of acts of terrorism will have to face challenges posed by 
opposing ideological and cultural views, as bigoted by different responses to 
multilateralism and unilateralism. Thereafter, the UNSCR 1566 picked up loose ends 
by actually explaining what the Security Council considers as terrorism: “criminal 
acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious 
bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the 
general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population 
or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
                                                             
89 Ibid. 
64 
 
doing any act.”90 Resolution 1566 also called for the creation of a working group that 
will expand the list of terrorist entities under sanction beyond the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda sanctions list. 
In post-9/11 era, the world faces two unique, but overlapping, problems; one is 
the threat of the global terrorists, who survive in states but are not always directly 
supported by them and the threat of state-sponsors of terrorism dedicated to acquiring 
weapons of mass destruction. With respect to states, it is a particular challenge to limit 
or, preferably, halt altogether their ability to use the international financial system to 
support their threatening behavior. The strategies needed to be employed to combat 
the threats posed by North Korea, Iran and Syria are good examples of the ways in 
which financial authorities are effective in dealing with state-sponsors of terrorism. 
Nearly 18 months after it became open for signature in December 1999, the 
United Nations Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism rested 
mainly overlooked and forgotten. That changed after 9/11. Signed by the U.S. on 
January 20, 2002 and led by the initiative of the UNSCR 1373 at end of September 
2002, the stale but potent international agreement has new life prompting a global 
effort to obstruct the financing of terrorism and terrorist acts. Before 9/11, only 41 
states had signed the convention. Since then, 91 more states have done so. Lebanon 
has not acceded to the U.N. Convention, though it has adopted laws domestically 
criminalizing any funds resulting from the financing or contribution to the financing 
of terrorism. 
International economic sanctions have become horrific to developing 
countries, their economies, and individuals. Proven potent global tools, economic 
sanctions drive governments, economies and individuals to be held accountable, 
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leaving them no choice but to comply with international standards and commit to the 
global fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. In end of 2010, 
Lebanon’s financial system have been put under scrutinized pressure by the US 
Treasury over allegations that the Lebanese Canadian Bank was involved in 
maintaining accounts of a money laundering and drug-trafficking international 
network linked to Hezbollah. Judicial procedures by the US government against 
international financial institutions such as Standard Chartered Bank and HSBC has 
cost both institutions to pay heavy monetary fines of which 1.9 billion was paid by 
HSBC alone on charges of dealing with private banking accounts of drug cartels in 
Mexico as well as defying economic sanctions by allowing financial transactions with 
Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan, and Burma (Myanmar). Therefore, Lebanon had to act fast. 
3.8 Lebanese Banks’ Money Laundering Concerns 
“Lebanon’s banking system provides the means by which Iran transacts funds 
transfers to evade the effects of sanctions and the growing international 
financial blockade against Iran, and allows the money transfers that support 
illicit weapons and other transactions, including with Syria. New York based 
United against a Nuclear Iran (UANI) made public the results of a three-
month, confidential investigation into the influence of Iran and Hezbollah on 
Lebanon’s banking system and sovereign bond market. The group says 
Lebanon’s financial system – including Banque du Liban, the country’s 
central bank – is being used to funnel massive amounts of illicit cash for 
Hezbollah and its state sponsor, Iran.”91 
 
“UANI who had successfully teamed up with U.S. lawmakers and pushed the 
European Union to force Belgium’s Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT), to disconnect blacklisted Iranian banks from its 
network; is pushing for the Treasury, which itself has intensified its scrutiny of 
Lebanese banks in recent months, to issue a finding designating Lebanon’s 
entire financial system as a money-laundering concern under section 311 of 
the Patriot Act. The U.S. issued such a finding against Iran’s banking sector in 
November 2011, the first time it had been used against an entire jurisdiction 
since 2003.”92 
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Even though Riyad Salameh, governor of Banque du Liban, has denied that 
any relationship between the latter and Iran exist; UANI argues that “despite 
Lebanon’s devastated economy, its currency and banking system operate as if they 
belonged within a more successful state. Lebanese sovereign debt to GDP ratio is the 
fourth highest in the world, yet the country’s sovereign bonds and credit default swaps 
trade at low yields, noting that the cost of Lebanese debt has decreased considerably 
since 2006, which coincides with increased sanctions pressure against Iran.”93 
“Unlike many other countries that sell Eurobonds and Treasury bills to foreign 
governments or financial institutions, Lebanon has kept its debt in-house, 
selling mostly to local banks or having the Central Bank itself buy up debt. 
According to the Central Bank, non-resident private sector deposits in local 
commercial banks have gone from just under $10 billion at the end of May 
2008 to over $21.6 billion at the end of May 2012. According to stats from 
UANI, only 2.6 percent of Lebanon’s debt is held abroad. This, the group and 
others argue, raises questions.”94 
 
Where, exactly, are local banks getting the cash – particularly in the past four 
years – to buy all these bonds and bills? 
The answer is largely unknown. Lebanon allows banking secrecy – meaning 
that only in a few circumstances are banks allowed to disclose information about their 
clients to authorities. Many, UANI among them, argue this opens Lebanon up to 
receive dirty money. For its part, the Central Bank says Lebanon is on the level, 
pointing to its Special Investigation Commission (SIC) tasked with keeping an eye on 
the financial sector and red-flagging potential money launderers. 
“It is unclear how the U.S. will react. The Treasury Department has for years 
been doggedly pursuing both Iranian and Hezbollah money, and there is no 
indication it will stop. That said, the U.S. has many allies in Lebanon, and 
taking the full measures UANI is asking for would be an economic catastrophe 
for the country. Would the Obama administration throw Lebanon under the 
bus like that?”95 
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Moving on to the next section, recent efforts to develop effective strategies for 
anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism bring together 
several distinct but related aspects of financial systems and criminal law. Financial 
intelligence units (FIUs) constitute an important component of these strategies. 
Combating the crimes of money laundering and financing of terrorism is essential to 
the integrity of financial systems but, if these efforts are to be successful, traditional 
law-enforcement methods need to be supported by the contribution of the financial 
system itself. Financial institutions hold critical information on transactions that may 
conceal criminal schemes. Although this information is covered by secrecy laws, it 
has to be made available to law-enforcement agencies to enable them to trace criminal 
money channels. 
In 1998, al-Madina Bank started to expand aggressively. With an absentee 
majority shareholder (Adnan Abou Ayash was living and working in Saudi Arabia) 
and an extravagant local helmsman, the bank started to drift into dangerous waters. 
The period 2001 and 2002 witnessed flagrant and profligate waste of financial 
resources, most often, associated with high profile purchases of real estate by 
members of the family of Rana Koleilat, particularly her brother Taha. By early 2002 
it was obvious that al-Madina Bank was in serious trouble. The Governor of the 
Central Bank wanted to either apply strict measures to correct the situation or solicit a 
commitment by the owner regarding liabilities. 
As of 1998, Adnan Abou Ayash made a number of transfers of funds to al-
Madina Bank, either to the account of his brother Ibrahim or to his own account (no. 
69911). It was later revealed that no such account number existed. In total, the 
transfers amounted to $1.25 billion, yet in early 2003 the Banking Control 
Commission (BCC) estimated that both al-Madina Bank and its affiliate United Credit 
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Bank owed roughly $465 million of which $300 million were personally owed by 
Rana Koleilat, and $133 million respectively. On the other hand, total facilities 
granted to regular clients by al-Madina and United Credit Bank was approximately 
$56 million and $17 million. It was obvious that normal commercial loans even if lost 
in total, were not the cause of lack of liquidity or accumulated losses, which exceeded 
$1.25 billion of transfers. How could al-Madina and its affiliate lose so much money? 
In fact, the funds were not totally lost but grossly misused or misplaced. Assets that 
exceeded hundreds of millions of dollars were acquired for much higher than actual 
values, while Ibrahim Abou Ayash and Taha Koleilat spent money without 
consideration for value. 
As of summer 2003, the Central Bank raised cases against Adnan Abou Ayash 
and Rana Koleilat and sought to secure assets that would cover defaulted debt. By 
early summer 2004, the al-Madina Bank’s debacle had petered out; nevertheless, a 
number of issues and questions remain. First, how could an insignificant employee 
with the bank since 1984 become a moving force in two banks whose shares were 
owned by a successful businessman with dealings with the Saudi royal family? 
Second, numerous financial dealings would appear to suggest the Koleilats had strong 
ties with Syrian intelligence officers. 
On the political spectrum, in late summer 2004, Security Council Resolution 
1559 was passed calling on the Syrian government to withdraw its military and 
intelligence forces from Lebanon, and demilitarization of Palestinian factions 
supported by Syria in Lebanon, as well as Hezbollah. Syria’s withdrawal was fulfilled 
by 26 April 2005 and thus enters Iran. At no time in recent history have Lebanon and 
Syria attracted as much international attention and action as after Hariri’s 
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assassination and the United Nations Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIC) 
was established by Security Council Resolution 1595 in June 2005. 
Consequently, both Patrick Fitzgerald, Deputy Commissioner of the Irish 
Police Force dispatched to Lebanon shortly after PM Rafiq Hariri’s who for nearly 
three decades, from 1978 until his assassination on 14 February 2005, played a vital 
role in shaping the political and economic future of Lebanon, and Detlev Mehlis, 
Commissioner of the (UNIIC), indicated the need to study al-Madina bank accounts 
of which the findings are still to be incurred in full for possible links to the terrorist 
bombing that killed Hariri and twenty-two other civilians. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT 
4.1 Introduction 
The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances can be seen as the starting point for the development of 
international anti-money laundering strategy by which criminals is be deprived from 
their economic resources and illicit proceeds of their crimes. Progress in this area has 
become a significant factor in the fight against money laundering, corruption, terrorist 
financing, and in protecting the integrity of the international financial system. 
Since the law-enforcement agencies had restricted access to relevant financial 
information, generally due to banking secrecy laws or to incompetence in exchange of 
information mechanisms; AML strategies mandated states to engage the financial 
system in the effort to combat money laundering while, at the same time, seeking to 
ensure the retention of the conditions necessary for its efficient operation. Therefore, 
“the realization of the need for a system requiring disclosures of suspicious 
transactions on the part of financial institutions created the need for a central office or 
agency for assessing and processing these disclosures.”96 
The very first few FIUs, established in the early 1990s, served as a central 
agency for receiving, analyzing, and disseminating financial information to combat 
money laundering. Over the following decade, the number of FIUs increased and the 
Egmont Group, the informal international association of FIUs, had 84 members in 
2003. In that same year the FATF adopted a revised set of recommendations on 
                                                             
96 International Monetary Fund, “Financial Intelligence Units: An Overview,” (Revised version of July 
23, 2004), see at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/FIU/fiu.pdf  
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combating money laundering that, for the first time, explicitly called for the need to 
establish a functioning FIU. Later on, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, in addition to several member countries have provided technical assistance in 
establishing and strengthening of FIUs and expanding their responsibilities to include 
dealing with the financing of terrorism, in addition to money laundering and other 
serious offences.”97 
This chapter examines how the latest efforts to develop efficient strategies for 
anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism has led to the 
founding of financial intelligence units that combine several diverse but unified 
elements of law enforcement.  
4.2 Typical FIU Information Flow Chart 
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By definition, FIUs are “agencies that receive and analyze suspicious 
transaction reports and other reports from reporting financial institutions and other 
entities, and disseminate information to law authorities and foreign FIUs.”98 
Establishing an FIU is an integral factor of a country’s AML strategy that reflects the 
level of commitment to combating financial crime and adherence to international 
standards.  It is optimal that FIUs be “customized to criminal standardized 
considerations specific to each country, and its basic features be consistent with the 
supervisory framework of the country, as well as with its legal and administrative 
systems and its financial and technical resources.”99 While the political support is 
indispensable to guarantee its success, “all FIUs, as government agencies, must be 
granted the level of autonomy necessary to carry out its duties while being answerable 
for the results it achieves.”100 
4.3 International Confidence 
International consideration for the FIU as a basic element of anti-money 
laundering strategy is very recent. In 1989, with the efforts of the FATF and 
international society, standards on combating money laundering were developed 
entailing the obligation of financial institutions to submit suspicious transaction 
reports to competent authorities that were recognized with the 1990 FATF 
Recommendations. Since these competent authorities were not defined, and could be 
any government agency for the purpose, it was only with the issuance of the 2003 
Recommendations that the need for an FIU as defined by the Egmont Group was 
spelled out. 
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4.3.1 The FATF 40+9 Recommendations 
The 1990 FATF Recommendations designated competent authorities for 
receiving and dispensing suspicious transaction reports and referred indirectly to some 
of the functions and features that could be granted to such authorities of which 
receiving suspicious transactions reports (STRs) or cash transactions above a certain 
threshold; providing guidance to financial institutions; maintaining an automated 
database, compliance control and supervision/regulatory powers; and carrying out 
international cooperation. Other regulations governing suspicious transactions reports 
were also set out in the recommendations, such as the immunity of those who in good 
faith submit reports to the FIU and the general rule against tipping off. 
The issuance of the revised FATF Recommendations in June 2003 was the 
turning point to the FATF’s approach to the FIU as the central recipient of reports. 
Now, with the FIU openly recognized as one of the competent authorities, the 
recommendations state that “the FIU should have sufficient financial, human, and 
technical resources, and authorities should provide the widest possible range of 
international cooperation to counterparts and exchange of information should be 
permitted without unjustifiable restrictive conditions.”101 
4.3.2 The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 
In 1995, Brussels, the Egmont Group of financial intelligence units was set up 
to support international cooperation and exchange of information. Countries had to go 
through a formal process in order to be recognized as operational FIUs that meet once 
a year and share administrative functions on a rotating basis. Since the Egmont Group 
is not an official institution, it has no stable secretariat. Besides its support position, 
Egmont’s working groups, and the Egmont Committee are used to carry out regular 
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duties. Although all FIUs function differently, nearly everyone can exchange financial 
intelligence and other governmental data and public record information with foreign 
counterparts. One of the main goals of the Egmont Group is to create a global network 
by promoting international cooperation among FIUs. 
4.3.3 The United Nations’ International Conventions 
In the last few years international conventions have recognized the vital role of 
FIUs and have provoked countries that are parties to these conventions to establish 
their own FIUs. The U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (1999), U.N. Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2001), 
and U.N. Convention against Corruption (2003) call for, equally, the criminalization 
of the financing of terrorism; criminalization of association in international organized 
crime, corruption, money laundering, and obstruction of justice, and criminalization 
of all forms of corruption, money laundering, concealment of the proceeds of crime, 
and obstruction of justice. A common factor in the three conventions is that each calls 
for countries that are parties to criminalize money laundering and to adopt preventive 
measures that are, in large part, inspired by the FATF recommendations, and refer to 
the obligation to report suspicious transactions to competent authorities. 
In the latest two conventions, referral to the FIU is explicit. For example, the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime calls for states to 
“ensure that administrative, regulatory, law-enforcement and other authorities 
dedicated to combating money-laundering … have the ability to cooperate and 
exchange information at the national and international levels … and to that end, shall 
consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre 
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for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential 
money laundering.”102 
4.3.4 Norms and Standards (EU Directives) 
The European Union has taken large steps to “combat money laundering and 
international organized crime. The EU directives outline part of the legal framework 
for the fight against money laundering in the members of the European Union.”103 
The IMF goes on to specify that “since these directives are meant to be applied in 
countries with conflicting legal systems, they are of concern to countries who are not 
members of the European Union.”104 
Firstly, the Council Directive on Prevention of the Use of the Financial 
System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (91/308/EEC) included three basic 
principles: full cooperation of financial institutions with authorities responsible for 
combating money laundering, blocking suspicious transactions until the responsible 
authorities (FIU) had been notified; and furnishing information to the FIU whenever, 
as a consequence of an examination or otherwise, supervisors or regulators of 
financial institutions discover facts that could constitute evidence of money 
laundering. Secondly, the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 
(2001/97/EC) amended the 1991 Directive and restated the key obligation of full 
cooperation and reporting of suspicious transactions set out in the previous and 
extends its reach beyond financial institutions to businesses and professions 
susceptible to money laundering. 
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4.4 Core Functions of an FIU 
In general, FIUs have four major types: administrative-type, law-enforcement-
type, judicial-type, and mixed or hybrid-type. However, such classifications, to a 
certain degree, are uninformed and that other ways of classifying FIUs are 
possible.”105 FIUs have three core functions receiving, analyzing, and disseminating 
of information concerning money laundering and financing of terrorism. According to 
its type, in some countries, the FIU is assigned extra functions. For example, the 
Special Investigation Commission (the FIU of Lebanon) monitors the compliance of 
financial entities with AML/CFT regulations and standards and has the power to 
block reported suspicious accounts for a specified time. The FATF Recommendations 
set a standard that countries should establish an FIU with the three core functions and 
include other requirements that relate to the effectiveness of these three functions. 
4.4.1 Who Must Report? 
Unlike the 1990 FATF Recommendations that offered countries the 
“alternative of having a permissive or mandatory system intended for financial 
institutions to report suspicious transactions;”106 the revised 2003 FATF 
Recommendations marked the expansion of the range of entities, beyond regulated 
financial institutions, subject to the reporting obligation. Moreover, countries were to 
consider setting up an extensive structure of reporting that would cover financial 
institutions and other non-regulated financial intermediaries, and to attend to risks of 
bureau de change. 
In 1999, in Moscow, the G8 Conference on Combating Transnational 
Organized Crime “agreed on putting certain responsibilities, as appropriate, on those 
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professions such as lawyers, accountants, company formation agents, auditors, and 
other financial intermediaries who can either block or facilitate the entry of organized 
crime money into the global financial system.”107 
Building on the G8 Gatekeeper initiative, the 2003 FATF Recommendations 
extended basic prevention requirements, including the reporting obligation, with some 
qualifications, to a list of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions 
(DNFBPs) including real estate agents; casinos; dealers in precious stones and metals; 
lawyers, notaries, and other independent professions and accountants in specific 
circumstances; and trust and company service providers. 
4.4.2 Suspicious Activity/Transaction Reporting (SARs/STRs) 
The 1990 FATF Recommendations stated that “countries should ensure that 
financial institutions monitor suspicious transactions; investigate their backgrounds; 
and keep their findings available for regulatory and law-enforcement authorities;”108  
though no requirement was set for them to report such to a specified competent 
authority. In fact, countries were encouraged to consider the feasibility and utility of a 
reporting system as it was not until the 1996 FATF Recommendations that suspicious 
transaction reporting was recognized as the international norm. In some countries, 
including the U.S., the obligation to report involves suspicious activities rather than 
suspicious transactions; whereas “the connotation of the former is broader than the 
latter, since it includes suspicious transactions and other circumstances that raise 
suspicions of criminal activities.”109 
The 2003 Recommendations leave to each country the decision to ascertain 
the degree of suspicion needed to trigger the reporting obligation. Recommendation 
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13 refers to a “financial institution that suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that funds are related to criminal activity.”110 Though the approach of reporting 
obligation varies from country to country, the fact remains that financial institutions 
and other reporting entities subject to the Know-Your-Customer (KYC) standards are 
in the best position to detect suspicious or unusual transactions. 
The main aim of reporting is to provide the FIU with information on 
transactions involving funds that could stem from criminal activity. In reality, 
however, the range of criminal offenses that constitutes criminal activity – and thus 
constitutes an obligation to report a transaction to which they are related – varies from 
country to country. 
The 2003 Recommendations attempted to provide further guidance in that 
respect. Recommendation 13 and its Interpretative Note define the standard for 
reporting with respect to categories of predicate offenses for criminalization of money 
laundering set out in Recommendation 1. It states that “countries should apply the 
crime of money laundering to all serious offenses, with a view to including the widest 
possible range of predicate offenses. The standard for criminalization, in turn, refers 
to the Vienna (1988) and Palermo (2000) Conventions.”111 
Whereas The Vienna Convention listed only drug-related offenses as predicate 
offenses, the Palermo Convention set out the norm that “predicate offenses should 
include the widest range of predicate offenses and all serious crimes, which the 
Convention defines as conduct constituting an offense punishable by imprisonment 
for a period of at least four years.”112 
With the issuance of the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Counter-
Financing of Terrorism in October 2001, most countries amended their respective 
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laws requiring that concerned entities report transactions suspected of being related to 
terrorism. Unlike money laundering transactions, terrorist financing transactions are 
illegal not because of the criminal origin of the funds, but in view of the criminal 
intent with which they are carried out. 
4.5 Exchange of Information with Other FIUs 
One of the most important functions of an FIU is unhindered exchange of 
information with counterpart FIUs. Recommendation 40 states that “countries should 
ensure that their competent authorities provide the widest possible range of 
international cooperation to their foreign counterparts… Where the ability to obtain 
information sought by a foreign competent authority is not within the mandate of its 
counterpart, countries are also encouraged to permit a prompt and constructive 
exchange of information with non-counterparts.”113 
Exchange of information among FIUs is laid down in the Egmont Group 
Principles for Information Exchange between Financial Intelligence Units for Money 
Laundering Cases and, further, in the Group’s best practices for the Implementation of 
Exchange of Information between FIUs. Egmont states that “information exchange 
among FIUs should be provided upon request or voluntarily for the sole purpose for 
which the information was requested or provided, and may not be disclosed to a third 
party or for the use as evidence in judicial proceedings without the prior consent of 
the disclosing FIU and in absolute confidentiality.”114 
4.6 FATF Mutual Evaluation of Financial Intelligence Units 
Starting 1992, assessments of AML/CFT systems including FIUs have been 
carried out since the first round of mutual evaluations of FATF members and in the 
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1996 Recommendations, FIUs were included in the expression competent authorities. 
With the endorsement of the revised FATF Recommendations and the FATF 
Methodology for Assessing Compliance with AML/CFT Standards by almost all 
institutions in 2003 and 2002 respectively, the assessments carried out included 
explicit mention of FIUs, although this was not yet officially a constituent of the 
international standard. 
Over the years, the FATF recommendations have been increasingly 
recognized as the universal standards for AML/CFT. In March 2004, “the Executive 
Boards of the IMF and the World Bank unconditionally endorsed the 2003 FATF 
Recommendations as the new standard in their work, in concert with a revised 
methodology to assess the new standards. Therefore, AML/CFT is now a permanent 
element of the international organizations’ work.”115 
4.7 Looking Ahead 
In general, among others, “the IMF has identified five challenges that appear 
as constants in the structure of FIUs and the development of existing ones.”116 The 
first is that “there is no set recipe to put together an FIU. Each FIU must be tailored to 
the specific conditions of the country in which it is placed.”117 All interested parties 
agree that factors such as the structure and relative weight of financial crime in the 
country, the political intent for combating such crime, the resources needed for the 
task and the legal and administrative systems all have to be taken into consideration in 
developing an FIU or suggesting procedures to improve the performance of an 
existing one. 
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The second challenge is, paradoxically, change. In several countries that have 
established FIUs over the past ten years or so, change has been evident, with their 
FIUs having had to launch as reliable associations competent in dealing with financial 
institutions and other reporting entities, other government agencies, and international 
counterparts, changing conventional interactions amid financial institutions and law-
enforcement authorities in the course. 
The third challenge facing FIUs is the integration of terrorist financing in their 
work, in addition to the expansion of the suspicious transaction reporting obligation 
beyond the regulated financial sector, and the quest for enhanced international 
cooperation. The inclusion of combating the financing of terrorism to the scope of the 
FIU’s functions presents special challenges. As noted earlier, terrorism is, in many 
ways, different from money laundering. Terrorism is usually not considered a profit-
motivated crime; and despite large amounts of funds may be drawn in the commission 
of terrorist acts, the purpose of depriving criminals of the proceeds of their illegal 
activity, which is at the heart of an anti-money laundering strategy, does not apply 
directly to terrorism. 
The fourth challenge faced by FIUs is that widening the scope of the reporting 
obligation beyond the regulated financial sector to include casinos; dealers in high-
value goods; and, more recently, the accounting and legal professions has had several 
implications for FIUs. Countries acknowledge that substantial outreach resources are 
likely to be needed to bring such professions into compliance with the reporting 
requirements. 
The fifth challenge compels FIUs to be gradually more involved in 
international cooperation. The extensive development of FIUs over the last fifteen 
years has been accompanied by an influential growth in international cooperation 
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between FIUs. Despite the progress achieved to date, significant challenges lie ahead, 
above all, removing legal obstacles that hinder information sharing and developing 
and improving systems to ensure the confidentiality of exchanged information. 
This chapter has attempted to summarize several topics under the general 
heading of what a financial intelligence unit is. Of the main points discussed is the 
objective of engaging the international society with its different and contradicting 
components to the fight against money laundering and the more compelling terrorist 
financing. Add to that the support of consenting states to the FATF’s global anti-
money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism strategy that would address the 
rising issues related to threats emanating from the financing of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction which is best dealt with through the consistent 
implementation of the U.N. targeted financial sanctions when these are called for. 
Improved transparency is vital to make it harder for criminals and terrorists alike to 
conceal their identities or hide their assets behind legal persons and arrangements and, 
in particular, when dealing with Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) that require 
stronger requirements through expanding the scope of money laundering predicate 
offenses to include corruption and tax evasion. For that matter, governments are urged 
to provide better operational tools and a wider range of powers and resources, both for 
the financial intelligence units, and for law enforcement to investigate and prosecute 
money laundering and terrorist financing.  
For their part, the financial systems are expected to utilize an enhanced risk-
based approach which enables countries and the private sector to apply their resources 
more efficiently by focusing on higher risk sectors where the level of mitigation 
applied is commensurate to the level of risk identified. More importantly is, the 
FATF’s call for a more effective international co-operation including exchange of 
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information among relevant authorities, conduct of investigations, and tracing, 
freezing and confiscation of illegal assets. The thesis now moves to the next chapter 
dealing with Lebanon’s financial system, its anti-money laundering and counter-
financing of terrorism regime and the role of the Central Bank of Lebanon in the last 
financial markets’ crisis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 LEBANON’S ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
COUNTER-FINANCING OF TERRORISM 
REGIME 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Lebanon’s experience, drawing on past financial crises of the 1960s to the 
most recent financial markets crisis and the economy’s responses to different systemic 
crises and exceptional policies by the Central Bank, has proven best case scenario of a 
resilient Lebanese economy. The Central Bank’s policy of maintaining an exchange 
rate peg to the U.S. dollar has proven indispensable in sustaining financial stability in 
hard times without compromising competitiveness and prosperity. 
At present,  
 
“foreign reserves held by the Central Bank pooled with the banking sector’s 
liquidity surplus appear sufficient to meet short-term pressures on the 
exchange rate. In the long run, however, monetary policies have to be geared 
to sustain the current exchange rate peg to the U.S. dollar.”118  
 
Therefore, it is possible to  
 
“emphasize not only best practices of the Lebanese decision-makers, but also 
expose a modern theory of liberal democratic market system that might shed 
some light on our understanding of banking soundness and prudential 
policy.”119 
 
Lebanon’s resolve has proven resilient despite the ensuing international 
pressures in a highly volatile political milieu. Prior to the international financial 
markets crisis, the long political impasse, the assassination of former Prime Minister 
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Rafiq Hariri (2005) and the July War (2006), the coordinated efforts of the Central 
Bank and financial sector to restore confidence has resulted in avoiding any 
devaluation of the Lebanese pound and risk of the financial system becoming illiquid 
helped by an ever willing domestic political consensual solidarity. Yet is such a 
coordinated and well-handled crisis management the result of concerted efforts of all 
or is it because former Lebanese militia landlords have all their interests vested in the 
financial sector? 
Regardless of the answer, the rejuvenation of Lebanon’s credit standing in 
international financial markets, as well as that of its financial sector, depends on 
attainable yet un-sustainable political stability in the country. Lebanon is one of the 
most important banking and financial centers in the Middle East. The economy is 
mainly dependent on the provision of services where the Banking Secrecy law applied 
therein along with a relatively liberalized banking sector has attracted important 
capitals mostly cultivated by the Arab world and the region’s financial market growth. 
This chapter provides a thorough overview of the Lebanese financial system 
with special focus on the role of the Central Bank and banking sector in developing 
timely responses to different systemic crises. It seeks to underline not only best 
practices of the Lebanese law-makers but also expose banking soundness and 
prudential oversight by all stakeholders through analytical discourse of Lebanon’s 
anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime in compliance with the 
international standards. 
5.2 The Lebanese Financial System 
Throughout 2007, “the U.S. subprime mortgage markets melted down and 
global money markets were under tremendous pressures. The U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis manifested itself first through liquidity issues in the banking system owing to a 
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sharp decline in demand for asset-backed securities.”120 Hard-to-value structured 
products and other instruments created during a boom of financial innovation had to 
be severely marked down due to the newly implemented fair value accounting and 
credit rating downgrades. Credit losses and asset write-downs got even worse with 
declining housing prices and accelerating mortgage foreclosures which increased in 
late 2006 and worsened further in 2007 and 2008. 
As a 2012 Brookings study makes clear: “what is exceptional about this crisis 
is that severe financial problems have emerged concurrently in many countries, while 
its economic impact had been felt globally due to the increased interconnectedness of 
world markets.”121 The world has gone through its greatest financial crisis since the 
collapse of the U.S. banking system in 1929. Yet, the crisis has had limited effect on 
Lebanon’s financial system which, despite its political imbalances, had shown great 
resilience basically lain by the system’s proficiency to similar situations stemming 
back to the civil war period. 
Lebanon has focused on conservative treatment of deposits, market discipline 
and strong supervision but also on retaining the open policy of interest rates practiced 
since the 1990s. These elements, combined with quantitative and qualitative high 
levels of regulatory laws and by-laws of the Central Bank, the predominance of  the 
family-led-banking business, and regulations that prohibit investing in structured and 
complex products have all contributed to Lebanon not being affected by the global 
financial crisis. 
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Lebanon’s free market economy, the absence of controls on movement of 
capital and foreign exchange, highly sophisticated labor force, good quality of life, 
and limited restrictions on investment have lured foreign businesses to set up offices 
in recent years. However, the country’s political and security environment may affect 
foreign investment in the long run. The political situation is delicate, and tensions 
could escalate before any constitutional upturn. In addition, a number of issues 
continue to cause frustration among local and foreign investors that include red tape 
and corruption, arbitrary licensing decisions, hard customs procedures, archaic 
legislation, an incompetent legal system, high taxes and fees, elastic interpretation of 
laws, and frail enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
“Lebanon is one of the few countries that has benefited from the global 
financial crisis. There was a significant increase in capital inflows mainly from 
the Lebanese Diaspora that perceived Lebanon’s banking sector as relatively 
safe given its high liquidity and high interest rates on deposits.”122 
 
As the International Monetary Fund has recently noted, “Lebanon benefits 
first and foremost from a perceived implicit guarantee from donors, but also from its 
reputation in credit markets and its unique investor base. Investors and depositors 
alike take comfort from the discernment that donors have signaled an implicit 
guarantee not to let Lebanon default and the fact that Lebanon has never defaulted on 
its external debt obligations in the past.”123 Local banks, which hold the majority of 
government paper, are an important pillar of stability, since their large exposure to 
sovereign debt creates strong incentives to stay the course, even through times of 
financial pressures. 
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In June 2006, “the IMF held a broad discussion of the concept of stability and 
resilience to fathom the development of macroeconomic vulnerabilities in Lebanon. It 
found that the solvency of the state and the high mutual exposure between the 
government and the domestic banking system remain the key vulnerability (distress in 
one of these sectors would rapidly be transmitted to the other one.)”124  
Remarkably, “twenty-seven percent of the Lebanese banks’ assets are in 
treasury bills, that is approximately sixty percent of total credit is owned by local 
banks which is, by international standards, very high.”125 Whereas banks remain the 
primary source for the government’s financing needs, the ensuing interdependence of 
the government, Central Bank, and commercial banks has created incentives for all 
actors to behave in a concerted way to preserve financial stability. 
Economic functionality and the high performance of the Lebanese banking 
sector has played a major role in financing the structural current account deficit of the 
Lebanese economy. Since 1997, a large number of banks subscribed in the Eurobonds 
of the Lebanese Government allowing the Central Bank to replenish its foreign 
reserves repeatedly and to protect its monetary policy of fixed exchange rate that 
could have been attainable otherwise. 
“Such financing attracted deposits and increased lending resulting in a 
significant growth that was able to maintain effective contact with, if not 
control over, the increasing amounts of money the Lebanese (mainly 
expatriates) succeeded in gathering thereby preventing the country from 
tackling significantly the international financial markets and avoiding its 
exposure to foreign debt risks.”126 
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5.3 The International Monetary Fund Mission to Lebanon 
In March 2009 the IMF declared that “Lebanon has shown remarkable 
strength in face of the unfolding global financial crisis. The financial system has had 
virtually no direct exposure to distressed financial products or markets and remained 
highly liquid, while economy continued to show considerable resilience.”127 
Despite the large fiscal and external vulnerabilities related to the sheer size of 
sovereign debt and government financing needs, prudent macroeconomic and good 
governance have strengthened the economy’s ability to ride out external shocks. Such 
policies helped maintain fiscal primary surpluses, a cautious interest rate policy, and 
strict oversight of the financial system. The primary surpluses have contributed in 
lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio by approximately 20 percentage points since 2006; an 
improvement toward fiscal consolidation. Authorities have maintained interest rates at 
appropriate levels to maintain ongoing deposit inflows, rapid de-dollarization, and 
strengthening of the external position. 
“Strict financial oversight has safeguarded the banking sector from exposure 
to troubled international banks, structured products and wholesale financial 
markets. Such policies helped maintain confidence in the financial system in 
particular and the Lebanese economy as a whole, allowing for a steep build-up 
of international reserves, even during the global financial crisis.”128 
 
“The IMF has adamantly supported these policies through a quarterly 
monitoring framework and two drawings under the December 2008 – June 
2009 Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) program, underscoring the 
program’s efficiency as a supporting tool for the authorities’ success in 
guarding macroeconomic and financial discipline in the ever more challenging 
external environment while the deep global recession and the dysfunctional 
international credit markets make it even more urgent for Lebanon to address 
its underlying vulnerabilities, mainly its very high level of public debt.”129 
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5.4 Lebanon’s AML/CFT Regime 
With the lack of meaningful statistics concerning the size of money laundering 
in Lebanon, authorities deem the major sources of illicit funds as resulting from 
criminal activities committed mostly abroad. 
Lebanon has been always a financial hub for banking activities in the Middle 
East and has had one of the most sophisticated banking sectors in the region. 
Nevertheless, “Lebanon faces significant money laundering and terrorist financing 
concerns related, for most but not least, to alternative drug trade and poor control of 
the cross-border cash transport.”130 It is worth mentioning that “Lebanon enjoys a 
considerable inflow of remittances from expatriates (estimated at $7 billion in 2009); 
though, a number of Lebanese abroad are considered to be involved in underground 
business and trade-based money laundering (TBML) activities.”131 Still, local 
authorities fail to recognize the money laundering methods and techniques that are 
generally used in the country. 
Regarding terrorism, two major terrorist acts were of great significance: the 
assassination of prominent Lebanese PM Rafic Hariri (2005) and the Nahr al-Bared 
terrorist attacks against the Lebanese Army (2008). It is clear that organized terrorism 
has a ripe ground in Lebanon, also financing sources that sustain these groups either 
locally or from abroad. However, the Lebanese authorities assume that the financing 
process is ambiguous and that it is generated outside Lebanon. In terms of combating 
terrorist financing and adjunct risks, no records are available; nevertheless, it is feared 
that such risks exist considering the attacks that have occurred during the last years. 
                                                             
130 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – US Department of State, “Money Laundering and 
Financial Crimes,” vol. 2, (Mar. 2010) see at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137429.pdf 
131 Ibid. 
91 
 
Throughout 2010, “the SIC investigated 179 cases of money laundering 
offenses and terrorist financing acts. Although the number of cases investigated has 
steadily increased from 116 cases in 2009, judicial proceedings, prosecutions and 
convictions in that regard are still lacking.”132 
In addition to the names of suspected terrorist individuals and terrorist groups 
on the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List, the SIC circulates, through 
the financial sector, a list of the U.S. Government’s Specially Designated Global 
Terrorists (SDGT), as well as entities designated by the European Union under its 
relevant authorities. On the other hand, “Lebanese law-makers should consider 
amendments to legislation to allow for extra forfeiture cooperation internationally and 
also provide a mechanism for returning of fraudulent proceeds.”133 
The INCSR went on to say that “it is indispensable that the Lebanese 
legislature approve a mandate concerning the enactment of a capable cross-
border cash declaration or disclosure system. One of the vulnerabilities of 
supervisory and regulatory authorities is the trading of bearer shares of 
unlisted companies as well as the absence of measures to criminalize tipping 
off. Moreover, the law authorities should emphasize linking predicate offenses 
to money laundering crimes. The SIC’s reliance on suspicious transactions 
reports filed by financial institutions to initiate investigations is a shortcoming. 
Safeguards at hand do not adequately address to the issue of Blood Diamond 
money laundering and value transfers through Lebanon or by traders overseas. 
Law enforcement authorities should examine domestic ties to the international 
network of Lebanese brokers and traders who are generally involved in 
underground finance, trade fraud, and trade-based money laundering 
activities.”134 
 
It is also essential that the Lebanese Customs inform the SIC of trade-based 
money laundering or terrorist financing suspicions; though, high levels of corruption 
within Customs, the report added, prevent the required inter-agency cooperation and 
make possible money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Then again, “Lebanon 
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should also consider joining the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism.”135 
5.4.1 Special Investigation Commission / Institutional Framework of AML/CFT 
Yet Lebanon has taken huge steps concerning the safety of the financial sector 
setting up sound preventive measures against money laundering and terrorist 
financing risks. By virtue of the Law No. 318 of April 20, 2001, the SIC was 
established. Its mandate is to investigate operations suspected of being related to 
money laundering crimes and the financing of terrorist acts. The SIC monitors the 
applicability and implementation of anti-money laundering policies and procedures 
and ensures that the financial sector is in compliance with the respective laws, 
circulars and guidelines of regulatory and supervisory bodies as well as its adherence 
to international standards recognized through the FATF 40 Recommendations, EU 
Directives, and associated best practices. 
5.4.2 Approach Concerning Risk 
Lebanon did not previously evaluate risks related to money laundering and 
terrorist financing activities in the financial sector and non-financial sector such as the 
Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions. However, frequent and timely 
amendments to law 318 by the Central Bank including amendments to the anti-money 
laundering system controlling the financial and banking operations required that 
banks and credit institutions adopt Risk-Based Approach for classifying customers 
and transactions. Such amendments rely on the FATF’s Risk-Based Approach, due 
diligence measures for verifying customers’ identities; and include guidelines to 
extract customer’s risks, assess both geographical regions and services rendered as 
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well as establishing proper procedures for corporeal control of high-risk customers 
and transactions. 
5.4.3 Progress Achieved 
Prior to the AML law 318 and owing to the lack of basic legislation for anti-
money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism in addition to strong legal 
provisions protecting the banking secrecy law of 1956, Lebanon was listed on the 
FATF’s list of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) in June 2000. On 
20 April 2001, the Cabinet passed the AML Law No. 318 and, accordingly, the SIC 
was established. The provisions of the law 318 included a definition of the crime of 
money laundering and sanctions imposed on its authors, and it exclusively granted the 
SIC the powers to lift the banking secrecy. 
As a result, Lebanon was de-listed from the NCCT in June 2002. Thereafter, 
major developments took place including the affiliation of the SIC to the Egmont 
Group of Financial Intelligence Units in July 2003; Lebanon’s membership to the 
Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) as well as 
its main role to create the latter as a FATF Style Regional Body (FSRB) at an 
inaugural Ministerial Meeting held in Bahrain in November 2004. The formation of 
the MENAFATF has made possible information exchange among member countries 
and, more importantly, has provided the technical support needed as well as assistance 
from international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF to regional 
countries. 
5.5 Mutual Evaluation of Lebanon’s AML/CFT Regime 
The evaluation of the anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regime 
was based on the FATF’s 40+9 Recommendations using the AML/CFT Methodology 
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of 2004. It covered the laws, regulations and other materials provided by Lebanon, as 
well as information obtained by the evaluation team during its on-site visit to Lebanon 
from 9 to 20 February 2009. During their mission, assessors reviewed the AML/CFT 
institutional framework, relevant laws, regulations, guidelines and requirements, and 
other AML/CFT measures applied through financial institutions and DNFBPs. 
5.5.1 Legal Systems and Related Institutional Measures 
Lebanese law criminalized the act of money laundering by virtue of the Law 
No. 318 of 2001 that was later amended in 2003. Criminalization was adherent to both 
the Vienna and Palermo Conventions regarding the material elements of crime. As for 
the mental part, the law specifically required the existence of knowledge factor in all 
forms of laundering except for concealing or providing false disclosures considering 
that the knowledge element can be inferred from the material act itself. Lebanon opted 
for the list of crimes approach but non-inclusive of all of the 20 crimes described in 
the FATF Methodology. 
The AML/CFT Law sanctions anyone who commits or contributes or 
participates in money laundering operations, but criminalization of attempted money 
laundering is not there. While legal entities shall be held punishable for criminal 
liability, sanctions for natural and legal entities are sound and proportionate according 
to international best practices. The effectiveness of sanctions imposed could not be 
assessed in the absence of statistical data; even though a number of convictions were 
issued in a number of money laundering cases. 
With regard to terrorist financing, Lebanese legislation has criminalized the 
act of financing of terrorism by virtue of the Law 553/2003. However, the definition 
was ambiguous as to what the financing act should include such as providing or 
collecting funds, as well as the act of terrorism financing does not cover terrorist 
95 
 
organizations and activities. Moreover, there is no indication whether the funds might 
be originating from legal or illegal sources. Each and every one of the accomplice, the 
instigator and anyone involved in the crime of terrorism financing shall be punished 
and the attempt at terrorist financing as well. According to the FATF 
Recommendation 17, sanctions imposed against natural and legal persons should be 
reasonable and proportionate. 
The crime of terrorist financing is a predicate offence of money laundering; 
yet, as a separate crime, it does not cover all elements of a predicate offence as 
required by the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 
On the other hand, the crime of terrorist financing is not valid if the act was financed 
overseas. Still, effective measures for counter-financing of terrorism cannot be 
assessed in the absence of reliable statistics. 
Both the Lebanese Penal Code and Law 318 include specific texts concerning 
the confiscation of funds and proceeds of crime while resting the burden of proof with 
the indicted. By rendering a final ruling in any crime of the predicate offences, the 
funds and proceeds of crimes shall be confiscated in favor of the state and the indicted 
shall have to prove the legitimate source of such funds or otherwise. It is worth 
mentioning that the effectiveness of confiscation arrangement was not assessed since 
no statistics were available for the evaluation team at the time of the assessment. 
5.5.2 Preventive Measures: Financial Institutions 
In addition to the Law 318, the Central Bank’s System of Controlling 
Financial and Banking Transactions is well thought-out secondary legislation. The 
Law and relevant circulars cover AML requirements such as the identification and 
verification of clients and beneficial owners as well as Customer Due Diligence 
(CDD). Although a high threshold was set for transactions involving life insurance 
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premiums; financial intermediaries, finance lease, insurance and exchange companies 
has no obligation to apply the same to infrequent transactions or those suspected of 
being related to money laundering, or where identification or information obtained of 
the legal position of persons, legal persons or arrangements are insufficient or 
inaccurate. 
It was established that requirements should be extended to financial 
institutions so as to identify and verify ownership and control structure of legal 
entities specifically where legal texts authorize the issuance of bearer shares, and to 
identify the natural person who has full ownership or control over the legal entity. 
Due diligence requires information obtained should include the purpose and type of 
business relationship, and when high risk customers or businesses; Enhanced Due 
Diligence (EDD) procedures also apply. Financial institutions should abide by their 
reporting obligations where due diligence measures for clients and beneficial owners 
cannot be realized. 
Financial institutions are not bound by law for management to identify 
whether a customer or a Beneficial Right Owner (BRO) is a Politically Exposed 
Person (PEP). There are no sufficient policies and procedures to prohibit the misuse 
of technology. The scope of obligations involving dealings with correspondent 
banking as well as non face-to-face business transactions is limited. With regard to 
reliance on third parties, there are limited obligations in place for banks and credit 
institutions since they lack required measures to identify non-resident customers as 
well as the absence of warning system for countries and territories that are non-
compliant with the FATF. 
Lebanon has held firmly to a banking secrecy system by virtue of the Banking 
Secrecy Law of 1956; yet, Law 318 explicitly grants the SIC the exclusive right to lift 
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the banking secrecy in cases suspected of being related to money laundering and in 
exchange of information with foreign counterparts. Regarding electronic transfers, the 
Central Bank’s decree of 2005 included the requirements of Special Recommendation 
VII with respect to the need to establish information about the originator of transfer. 
With respect to record keeping and wire transfer obligations, there are provisions 
binding banks and intermediary credit institutions to keep records of transactions for a 
period of five years. Money dealers of Category A should implement an effective 
risk-based approach to adequately identify transfers with missing information; 
however, a high threshold of $10,000 is set for wire transfers that need customer 
identification.  
Banks and credit institutions are asked to update files, transactions and 
businesses, except for the requirement to keep records of unusual transaction reports 
for a period of five years. There is no similar commitment for financial 
intermediaries, finance lease, insurance and exchange companies to monitor unusual 
transactions. Financial institutions shall be required to abide by the necessary 
measures regarding business relationships and transactions with customers (including 
legal persons and other financial institutions) in countries that do not or insufficiently 
apply the FATF Recommendations. It is necessary to have effective control measures 
that ensure that financial institutions are aware of ML/FT risks and correspondent 
anti-measures in other countries and transactions or businesses that do not have an 
apparent or visible economic or lawful purpose as well. 
Law 318 further stipulates that financial institutions are required to submit 
Suspicious Transactions Reports (STRs) to the SIC; yet, the definition of illicit funds 
does not include the proceeds of 20 predicate offenses mentioned in the methodology. 
Moreover, financial institutions are not required to report transactions suspected of 
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being related to the financing of terrorism including reporting of attempts of money 
laundering.  In light of the low number of reported cases, or absence on part of the 
remaining institutions, the competency and efficiency of financial institutions is 
inadequate with respect to AML/CFT international standards. 
Not all institutions subject to Law 318, their directors, officers and employees 
have legal protection against criminal and civil liabilities when disclosing information 
or reporting concerns to the SIC. On the other hand, the SIC is responsible for raising 
awareness, providing training on real-life cases, issuing annual reports; as well as 
providing feedback to the reporting entities. It is worth mentioning that there is no 
reporting system for cash transactions that exceed a designated threshold. Instead, a 
Cash Transaction Slip (CTS) is collected and kept upon deposit of cash or when the 
total of several deposits on a single day exceeds the designated threshold of $10,000 
or its equivalent in other currencies indicating the amount, source and object of funds 
as well as the beneficial right owner. 
Moreover, not all financial institutions (excluding banks and credit 
institutions) are required to set an operating manual including policies, procedures, 
and internal controls for their AML/CFT programs. Arrangements for setting up a 
compliance unit include designation of a full-time compliance officer and establishing 
an independent audit function, while providing for an ongoing staff training program 
and screening of new employees. Not all institutions are required to ask their 
subsidiaries and branches abroad to apply AML/CFT measures when dealing with 
countries that do not apply or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations. 
The Central Bank has set up special procedures to ensure that no shell banks 
are established. While banks and credit institutions were bound to verify the identity 
and activities of their correspondent banks, and that they effectually exist according to 
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official identification documents obtained; other financial institutions that might deal 
with correspondent banks were not obliged to verify that their correspondents are not 
dealing with shell banks. Besides, there are no texts providing for the implementation 
of administrative sanctions against institutions violating the Law 318. 
5.5.3 National and International Cooperation 
Both the National Coordination Committee for Anti-Money Laundering and 
the National Coordination Committee for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism were set up for the sole purpose of increasing interagency cooperation. The 
principle for mutual legal assistance is judicial cooperation based on agreements; and 
where no such agreements exist, Lebanon shall adopt the principle of reciprocity. 
However, agreements of that sort are not applicable in the case of terrorist financing; 
for they are subject to the general rules in effect for the request of assistance related to 
other crimes. Besides, the SIC can request information from foreign counterparts, 
judicial, supervisory, and law enforcement authorities and vice versa. Information 
exchange is conducted through mutual legal assistance treaties and judicial 
cooperation between competent authorities while at other times through the Egmont 
secured web-mail. 
In relation to the extradition law, Lebanon is highly cooperative in assisting 
and overcoming any legal obstacles where the requestor criminalizes the principle act 
of crime. Lebanese citizen shall not be extradited but brought before the local courts. 
Individuals who commit the crime of money laundering and terrorist financing shall 
be extradited according to the requests of their extradition and shall be subject to the 
same rules imposed on persons who have committed all types of crimes, unless a 
special agreement is signed between Lebanon and the country regarding the crime of 
money laundering and terrorist financing in particular. It is worth mentioning that the 
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money laundering crime does not encompass all underlying crimes; hence, affecting 
the ability of the country to offer full international cooperation in this regard. No case 
of extradition was reported whatsoever and there are no procedures or arrangements 
for the seizure and confiscation of assets with other countries. Lebanon has not yet 
considered the possibility of establishing a fund for confiscated assets as well. 
We now turn to the last section of this chapter showing how, in early 2012, the 
U.S. Treasury Department’s designation of a number of Lebanese citizens as drug 
kingpins and terrorists for allegedly working as part of a South American money-
laundering and drug-trafficking cartel with links to Hezbollah has turned into one of 
the worst nightmares for Lebanese banks. In early 2011, the Lebanese Canadian Bank 
was designated as a financial institution of primary money laundering concern for its 
part in transferring funds and assets for drug-traffickers in South America, the Middle 
East, Europe and Africa and laundering as much as $200 million every month through 
cash smuggling and Lebanese businesses as well as for financing Hezbollah. 
As a matter of fact, “the Treasury Department has designated more than 1,100 
people as kingpins. The 1999 act freezes and allows the government to seize 
all property and assets of the designated person that are under U.S. authority. 
Penalties for violations if captured and deemed guilty include up to ten years 
in prison and fines. Being designated as a global terrorist by the U.S. 
Government freezes a person’s assets and prohibits dealings with them.”136 
5.6 The Lebanese Canadian Bank 
Section 311 of the Patriot Act  
 
“authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, upon finding that reasonable 
grounds exist for concluding that a foreign jurisdiction, institution, class of 
transaction, or type of account is of primary money laundering concern, to 
require domestic financial institutions to take certain special measures against 
the targeted primary money laundering concern… and to bring additional 
pressure on those jurisdictions and institutions that pose money laundering 
threats. Through the imposition of certain special measures, more information 
can be obtained about the targeted jurisdictions, institutions, transactions, or 
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accounts; or can prohibit U.S. financial institutions to involve with 
jurisdictions, institutions, transactions, or accounts of money laundering 
concern.”137 
 
On February 17, 2011, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultations with 
relevant Federal agencies and departments, and after consideration of the factors 
enumerated in section 311, through his delegate, the Director of the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), established that “reasonable grounds exist to 
proclaim that the Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL (LCB) is a financial institution of 
primary money laundering concern.”138 
FinCEN had reason to believe that “LCB had been routinely used by drug-
traffickers and money launderers operating in various countries in Central and South 
America, Europe, West Africa, the Middle East, and the U.S.; that Hezbollah, which 
Lebanon considers to be a legitimate political party and resistance organization, 
generated revenues from the criminal activities of this network and that LCB 
executives who are complicit in money laundering activities provided financial 
services to Iranian officials.”139 
Back in 2009, a trusted billionaire Shiite businessman and financier from 
southern Lebanon, Salah Ezzedine who “organized pilgrimages to Mecca, ran a major 
Beirut publishing house and a children’s television station, held major investments in 
eastern European oil and iron conglomerates, and – much more to the point – was a 
close personal friend of very senior leaders of Hezbollah, turned out to be an ‘Abu 
Madoff’, declaring himself bankrupt, to the tune of $1.195bn, after promising his 
trusting investors an astonishing 40 per cent interest on their deposits – which, 
according to judicial officials in Lebanon, he eventually could not pay. It appeared 
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that Ezzedine’s financial collapse became inevitable after he wrote a $200,000 cheque 
to Hussein Hajj Hassan, one of Hezbollah’s general secretary Hassan Nasrallah’s 
closest political advisers and a Hezbollah member of parliament. The cheque 
bounced. The response to this within Hezbollah’s bunkers can only be imagined.”140 
To the deep embarrassment of the Iranian-financed and armed militia, 
Hezbollah remained strangely silent, an unusual characteristic for such a publicity-
conscious movement who had built its prestige in the Arab world on its squeaky-clean 
reputation for financial and political probity. Some commented that Middle East 
dictatorships and the third-rate leadership of the Palestinian Authority may salt their 
millions away in foreign bank accounts, but not the ‘incorruptible’ Hezbollah whose 
own millions – faithfully shipped in US currency bills to Beirut from Tehran – rebuilt 
dozens of Shiite Muslim villages in southern Lebanon and thousands of home-owners 
in the Dahiya area of Beirut that were destroyed in Israel’s bombing of Lebanon in 
2006. 
Lebanon’s banks had no exposure to a “Bernard Madoff-style Ponzi 
scheme”141 run by a Lebanese businessman accused of defrauding investors. 
Lebanon’s Central Bank governor Riad Salameh said “there is no exposure by the 
banks to it,”142 and “it has nothing to do with the finance or banking industry. He had 
his own investors, and it’s a private matter that’s outside of the banking industry.”143 
The scandal has embarrassed Hezbollah which prides itself on a reputation for 
honesty and selfless piety. It has also illustrated the way many of Lebanon’s Shiites, 
despite their ascent from near feudal poverty just a few decades ago, remain in some 
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ways a nation apart. Their residual distrust of mainstream Lebanese institutions, 
which helped fuel Hezbollah’s rise as a virtual state within a state, also appears to 
have made them vulnerable to Mr. Ezzedine’s schemes. 
“It is still not clear what happened to the money,”144 according to a judicial 
official with knowledge of the case who spoke on condition of anonymity, saying he 
was not authorized to comment publicly. “Mr. Ezzedine, who is now in jail awaiting 
trial, invested in metals, oil and other commodities in Africa and the Middle East, 
according to several people who knew him.”145 
In response to US pressures regarding the Lebanese Canadian Bank SAL, Mr. 
Salameh said that “Beirut financial authorities are continuing to investigate the 
Lebanese Canadian Bank whereas an autonomous Special Investigation Commission 
is initiating procedures and conducting investigations...concerning the accounts that 
cause concern.”146 
Executives at Société Générale and SGBL took stringent efforts last year to 
ensure that none of LCB's suspect accounts were transferred to SGBL. The bank hired 
Ernst & Young LLP, Deloitte & Touche LLP and the Ashcroft Group, headed by 
former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, to oversee the auditing of these assets. 
“SGBL's first priority is compliance with strict anti-money laundering 
principles, over and above U.S. and European standards,”147 said Mr. Ashcroft, who 
continues to advise SGBL. “Their first step in the acquisition was to institute a robust 
filtering process that identified and rooted out potentially criminal and terrorist-related 
assets before any purchase could be made.”148 
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Mr. Ashcroft and SGBL officials said LCB's board was fired as part of the 
merger, as well as roughly half of the bank's original 720 employees. Of the 
remaining 370 employees, most are lower-level workers, such as bank tellers, but 
some senior-level managers from the Lebanese Canadian Bank remain at SGBL. 
Among them are two former top officials of Prime Bank Gambia Ltd., which was 
majority-owned by Lebanese Canadian Bank before it closed last year, SGBL 
confirmed. They were Prime Bank Gambia's chairman and its chief executive when it 
was cited last year by the Treasury for alleged money-laundering activities. 
The Lebanese Canadian Bank case ended up with the Lebanese banking sector 
being exposed to international and US scrutiny. Accommodating to the US demands 
is a short-term solution but the consequences and costs for implicating not only the 
Lebanese financial system but also the Central Bank and its governor could be heavy. 
In the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) of March 
2012, the U.S. Department of State claimed that “Lebanon faces money laundering 
and terrorist financing vulnerabilities and that part of the generous flow of remittances 
from the Lebanese Diaspora, estimated at $7 billion – 21% of GDP – in 2009, 
according to the World Bank, could be linked to underground and Trade-Based 
Money Laundering (TBML) activities.”149 
Moreover, illegal proceeds come primarily from local criminal activity and 
organized crime. Lebanon’s Customs supervises two free trade zones operating in the 
country. While Lebanon has ratified the U.N. Anti-Corruption Agreement pursuant to 
Law No. 33/2008 in addition to the issuance of Law No. 32/2008 which granted the 
SIC the power to investigate corruption related cases, high levels of corruption create 
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vulnerabilities for TBML and other threats. On the other hand, Lebanon has not yet 
agreed to a cross-border cash reporting system, resulting in major cash-smuggling. 
After 9/11, Arab states have become increasingly aware of the need to play an 
active role in combating money laundering and terrorist financing by forging 
partnerships with the international community. Several Arab states have embarked on 
a series of financial and regulatory reforms to their banking and financial markets in 
accordance with their legal frameworks and cultural values. On-site evaluation visits 
by FATF to MENA countries confirmed the commitment of those to create effective 
arrangements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, in line with FATF 
Recommendations as well as international standards and best practices. 
The thesis now turns to its concluding chapter by answering the research 
question stated at the outset of the thesis: can Lebanon sustain its leading role as one 
of the most important financial and banking centers in the Middle East based on its 
longstanding banking secrecy law while proving itself compliant with international 
pressures regarding anti-money laundering and counter financing of terrorism global 
standards. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
The concluding chapter seeks to summarize various discussions in the thesis 
and provides an answer to the central research question: How has Lebanon sustained 
its leading role as one of the most important financial and banking centers in the 
region based on its longstanding banking secrecy practices as well as complied with 
international pressures regarding anti-money laundering and combating the financing 
of terrorism international standards? The chapter will also contribute to answering 
several other relevant concerns important for both their theoretical and policy-making 
implications. Through policy and discourse analysis, it will discuss different 
perspectives of international relations theory, the role of international law, IGOs, and 
NGOs in policy formation and how these may shape issues and affect state’s agenda, 
the still to be unrivaled sole proprietor of power, on several global issues such as 
money laundering and terrorist financing within the contextual change in world 
politics. 
6.1 Answering the Research Question 
A scrutiny of the existing laws and by-laws concerning the subject matter at 
hand, this thesis examines how Lebanon’s domestic politics and law-makers, though 
differing on countless issues, agree on the importance of preserving a strong financial 
system – more specifically a surviving economy – and the likely consequences of 
failure. By framing a direct relationship between an independent Central Bank and a 
benign political will, compliance to AML/CFT international standards can be only 
assessed within the confines of maintaining the bank secrecy, in justifying a more 
democratic financial market’s mechanism, and in defense of the sovereign state and 
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its citizens. Compliance is established through regulatory laws and supervision, 
however, certain impediments to the law authorities such as tipping-off and high level 
corruption can lead to weakening the country’s compliance with international 
standards due to lack of meaningful sanctions and material convictions. Nevertheless, 
non-compliance with international standards would have placed severe costs on the 
financial system and the economy being designated as non-compliant with respect to 
anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards. 
In the last few years, “with every major national, regional, or international 
failure of governance, a financial scandal has been found lurking. With each scandal 
has been the systemic use of banking and financial secrecy to hide criminal activity. 
Incessantly, political conflict and political destabilizing activity, including grand 
corruption, drugs trafficking, arms smuggling, and civil war have been facilitated and 
sustained by illicit finance networks set in the world’s licit financial services 
infrastructure. Major international banks in Europe, the Americas and the Middle East 
processed the funds moved from the Persian Gulf by al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden 
to terrorist cells around the world, transmitting them electronically into cash delivered 
by automated teller machines. Even countries with strong anti-money laundering, 
financial transparency and disclosure systems continue to find themselves victimized 
by regulatory failures. The common infrastructure of global banking and financial 
services has been abused by criminals to accomplish serious crimes.”150 
Affluent countries like the G8 members or the European Union “may be able 
to endure and eventually eliminate abuse of their financial institutions by criminals, 
fraudsters, corrupt officials, and terrorists who launder hundreds of billions of dollars 
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per year in illicit funds.”151 On the other hand, economies of developing countries, 
“the theft of natural resources or development assistance, international aid, capital 
losses from public funds gone missing, or the perversion of government institutions 
through bribery, create burdens that are not so easily managed.”152 
“There is a rising concern that globalization has made possible the 
augmentation of local financial problems into international ones. Indeed, 
regional and international financial contagions are a direct result of a process 
of globalization that has also facilitated the transmission of financial crises 
across national borders. Illicit finance has played and continues to play a key 
role in undermining many of the goals of the U.N. and international security 
policy. Dirty money laundered through international financial institutions 
threatens democracy, human rights, free markets, the environment, sustainable 
development, global governance, political stability, and civil society. Financial 
transparency is the basic structural requirement by which governments; 
regulators, law enforcement, judicial authorities, and civil society can 
advocate supervision and be adamant on the accountability of both essential 
private sector and public sector actors.”153 
 
Since no state acting alone can achieve its aims; international co-operation is 
crucial; and international law is the framework within which international co-
operation takes place. This was made clear by the former British Foreigner Secretary, 
Douglas Hurd who claims that “nation states are…incompetent. Not one of them, not 
even the United States as the single remaining super-power, can adequately provide 
for the needs that its citizens now articulate. The extent of that incompetence has 
become sharply clearer during this century. The inadequacies of national governments 
to provide security, prosperity or a decent environment have brought into being a 
huge array of international rules, conferences and institutions; the only answer to the 
puzzle of the immortal but incompetent nation state is effective co-operation between 
those states for all the purposes that lie beyond the reach of any one of them.”154 
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Reference to the vast assortment of international rules, conferences and 
institutions suggests something of the processes by which the rules of international 
law are made. Take for example the question of terrorist financing. No state can 
prevent global terrorism by acting alone. It may impose severe restrictions upon its 
financial system and engage in massive counter-financing of terrorism measures; but 
if no other state is doing so, its efforts will be practically pointless. Worse, the 
additional costs imposed on financial institutions and citizens as a result of those 
measures will tend to put that state’s economy at a competitive disadvantage. 
Unilateral action is at best ineffective and may be positively counter-
productive. In a perfect world, all states would impose the same counter-financing of 
terrorism policies, at a level sufficient enough to achieve the desired safety of the 
international financial system. Co-operation is indispensable; and co-operation needs 
a framework. States must contact each other and know who is competent to give 
binding rules that will be respected by the government, the legal systems, and other 
public authorities of partner states. They need to show how a particular agreement 
approved by a state is legally binding, and is not regarded simply as a matter of policy 
that can be changed or abandoned at will by the other state. These matters are 
governed by principles of diplomatic law and treaty law. 
What international law does and how the international legal system operates is 
well expressed by J.L. Brierly who states that “any intelligent study of the problems 
of international relations must raise the question of the role, if any, to be assigned in 
them to law.”155 Brierly believes that “some knowledge of the system as it is actually 
practiced between states is vital as an antidote both for exaggerated hopes and for 
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cynical indifference,”156 and he contemplates that “international law is neither a 
chimera nor a panacea, but just one institution among others which we have at our 
disposal for the building up of a saner international order.”157 We turn now to an 
assessment of the theoretical perspectives of international law. 
6.2 The Role of International Law 
Ever since the beginning of the new millennium, international law has 
captured the headlines more than perhaps at any other time. In the aftermath of 9/11, 
the U.S. military responses to terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, and mounting 
humanitarian crises, international treaties have become well-known. International law 
consists of a body of both rules and norms regulating the interactions among states, 
between states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and in more limited cases 
among IGOs, states, and individuals. These norms demand obedience and compel 
behavior. 
At the state level, law is hierarchical. Established structures exist for both 
making law (legislatures and executives) and enforcing law (executives and 
judiciaries). In the international system, authoritative structures are absent. Given the 
absence of a sovereign body with enforcement power, is there international law, and 
why comply? Legal scholar Christopher C. Joyner argues that “international legal 
rules obtain their normative force not because any superior power or world 
government prescribes them but because they have been generally accepted by states 
as rules of conduct, with the expectation that states will follow suit.”158 
On the other hand, realists remain skeptical about the utility of 
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and international 
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law. In the view of many, these are but reflections of state power and hence have no 
independent identity or role in international relations. Radicals, too, view international 
organizations and law as mere reflections of political and economic hegemony. 
However, liberals and constructivists believe that IGOs, NGOs, and international law 
matter, yet with a different emphasis. To liberals, these organizations and 
international law do not replace states as the primary actors in international politics, 
although in a few cases they may be moving in that direction; but they do provide 
alternative venues to discuss the new globalizing issues and an arena for action, 
whether intergovernmental or private, for states themselves and for individuals to join 
with other like-minded individuals in pursuit of their objectives. Constructivists place 
critical importance on institutions and norms. The emphasis is on how changing 
norms and institutions shape issues. Both IGOs and NGOs can be norm entrepreneurs 
that socialize and teach states new norms. Those norms may change state preferences, 
which, in turn, may influence state behavior. 
6.3 Assessing Unanswered Questions in the Thesis 
The 2008 global crisis has given way to a proliferation of international 
consensus meant for increasing oversight and supervision of financial markets 
participants. Yet how these rules work is not well understood. Because international 
financial rules are expressed through informal, non-binding accords, scholars tend to 
view them as either weak treaty substitutes, or by-products of national power. Rarely, 
if ever, are they cast as independent variables that can inform the behavior of 
regulators and market participants alike. Anti-money laundering and combating the 
financing of terrorism international standards present an alternative theory for 
understanding their rationale, processes, and limitations. Drawing on a close analysis 
of the post-crisis financial system, “international financial law is often bolstered by a 
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range of reputational, market, and institutional mechanisms that make it more 
coercive than classical theories of international law predict.”159 
The FATF provides a sophisticated soft law that offers a lucid and 
comprehensible introduction to several regulatory bodies and coordinating networks 
that contribute to the oversight of global finance. As noted before, “the PATRIOT Act 
and FATF are two major tools which, along with other related legislation in individual 
countries, have formed a multifaceted, globally interconnected system of laws and 
regulations that international financial systems must know.”160 
As well, the complexity of how instruments like the UNSCRs, the EU 
Directives, and the FATF recommendations are implemented in different legislation 
of member countries is so huge that there is an palpable need for coordination and 
flexibility of entry for all nations including least developed countries to be involved in 
the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.  
“The existing international initiatives to react to these problems are creating a 
global system of international standards for transparency. There is mounting 
evidence to justify questioning whether global financial institutions 
transferring money instantaneously across national borders can be readily 
regulated or supervised by any one organization. While these financial 
institutions may have their headquarters nominally based in a single country – 
typically one of the G8 countries, the EU or Switzerland – they generate 
profits and carry out activities on a global basis involving several FATF 
member states. As a result, they are for many reasons beyond the capacity of 
any single state to police.”161 
6.4 Global Economic Interdependence 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye argue that “the international 
organization model assumes that a set of networks, norms, and institutions, once 
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established, will be difficult either to eradicate or drastically to rearrange. Even 
governments with superior capabilities will find it hard to work their will when it 
conflicts with established patterns of behavior within existing networks and 
institutions. Under these conditions the predictions of overall structure theories will be 
incorrect: regimes will not become congruent with underlying patterns of state 
capabilities, because international organizations… will stand in the way.”162 
Perhaps an examination of the phenomenon of global economic 
interdependence is essential for our understanding of the present day international 
system. Keohane and Nye highlight that “advanced communications, economic and 
social transactions, and human aspirations are creating a world without borders, a 
global village, and an era of interdependence.”163 Interdependence refers to a state of 
mutual dependence in which the outcomes of specified actions are characterized by 
asymmetrical reciprocity among actors in different countries. 
First, in an economic sense, interdependence is present when there is increased 
national sensitivity and vulnerability to external economic conditions. According to 
Keohane and Nye, sensitivity “involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy 
framework how quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, 
and how great are the costly effects; whereas vulnerability is defined “as an actor’s 
liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been 
altered.”164 Here, interdependence, with its dimensions of sensitivity and 
vulnerability, is seen as a process by which a power relationship among groups and 
societies outside state’s control can be established. 
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Second, in a political sense, complex interdependence undermines an 
international hierarchy in terms of linkages across issue-areas, in terms of formal 
contacts between societies. Keohane and Nye note that “under conditions of complex 
interdependence, strong states would find it more difficult to use their military 
strength to control the outcomes on issues of non-military nature; that military 
security does not always dominate the international agenda; and that national societies 
interact through multiple channels and not just through inter-governmental 
contacts.”165 
Furthermore, the authors argue that a broader approach to global affairs 
beyond the state-centric (realist) view is needed in order to comprehend the present 
transition in international relations. They define world politics “as all political 
interactions between significant actors in a world system in which a significant actor 
is any somewhat autonomous individual or group that controls substantial resources 
and participates in political relationships with other actors across state lines. Such an 
actor need not be a state.”166 
Keohane and Nye do not argue that this complex interdependence truly 
reflects world political reality. They believe, however, that cooperation among 
nations, the greater role played by non-governmental actors, the close link between 
domestic and foreign policies, international regimes, and the role of international 
organizations in political bargaining hold the answer to world problems. They define 
regime is “as a set of norms, rules and decision-making procedures worked out by the 
interested states to regulate their relationship in a given issue-area.”167 
Understanding the development of regimes is central to understanding the 
politics of international organizations. There are numerous examples which can be 
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cited in the regime literature, it would be that of both the United Nations, for the 
matter at hand, with its conventions and the Financial Action Task Force 
recommendations for anti-money laundering and counter-financing of terrorism. In 20 
years of its existence, the FATF has made considerable progress in identifying and 
coordinating the response to global threats posed by illegal financial activity. 
6.5 The Challenge to Realism from Interdependence 
Complex interdependence as described in Keohane’s and Nye’s work, 
consisting of multiple channels of communication, the absence of hierarchy among 
issues, with military force playing a minor role, did not so much rock the foundations 
of Realist orthodoxy as knock politely on the door. Keohane and Nye restricted the 
use of the concept applying their work to economic issues, only offering complex 
interdependence as an alternative to Realism when it provides greater understanding 
of the nature of the issue in a particular situation, an area where realists were willing 
to concede to a development of their ideas to encompass the changing economic 
realities. Terrorism is multi-faceted and multi-dimensional. It represents a challenge 
to the orthodox view of separation of domestic and foreign policy by International 
Relations scholars, and it necessitates multi-lateral co-operation among governments. 
The domestic effects of international terrorism can be seen to blur the artificial divide 
between what have been seen as two separate fields of study. 
However, James Rosenau states in The Study of Global Interdependence that 
“the restriction of the concept to economic issues and thereby merely adapting the 
Realist paradigm to changes in the real-world limits the usefulness of the concept.”168 
Interdependence, when followed to its logical theoretical conclusions, giving non-
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state actors influence in world affairs, is a direct challenge to the Realist paradigm. 
Furthermore, a focus on the issues and interactions among actors, rather than the units 
themselves, and the idea of a multiple issue-based systems, rather than a single 
international system, with each system featuring a unique cast of governmental, inter-
governmental and non-governmental actors gives a more useful framework for an 
analysis of regime creation. Global action on terrorism clearly demonstrates the 
immediate and increasing interdependence of world politics as understood by 
Rosenau, with the inclusion of non-state actors giving the term interdependence a 
greater meaning. No one country can hope to isolate itself from such a transnational 
phenomenon, or hope to resolve its domestic terrorism independently. 
Rosenau identifies four characteristics that seem salient as central features of 
all the diverse issues of interdependence which “involve highly complex and technical 
phenomena, have non-governmental actors and fragmented governmental decision-
making, and necessitate multi-lateral co-operation for their management.”169 Global 
response to terrorism clearly demonstrates the features of interdependence as outlined 
earlier. Furthermore, as Rosenau explains, “most of the issues overlap so thoroughly 
that proposed solutions to any one of them have important ramifications for the 
others.”170 Terrorism phenomenon clearly illustrates these two points. As has already 
been stated, terrorism is a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional problem and is too 
complex to be viewed as a single issue. 
Rosenau’s concept of interdependence as outlined above challenges the 
traditional distinction between domestic and international politics in Hans 
Morgenthau’s analysis of international politics that views “the nation-state as the sole, 
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principal actor in the international arena and that the dominant issue in international 
relations is the struggle for power.”171 
Efforts to fight terrorism suggest the domestic and the international are 
inextricably linked. Indeed, with the case of the counter-financing of terrorism in the 
aftermath of 9/11, international legislation preceded national legislation, challenging 
another Morgenthau concept, central to the Realist understanding of agenda-building, 
that of the national interest as well as  state sovereignty suggesting that no one 
country can deal with this multi-faceted and multi-dimensional phenomenon in 
isolation. The terrorist organizations of today vary widely, ranging from large, 
structured groups to small, decentralized and self-directed networks. Detecting and 
disrupting a specific terrorist attack via monitoring of the financial system is 
extremely challenging, however, “The direct costs of a terrorist attack are only a 
fraction of a terrorist organization’s demand for funds. The broader organizational 
costs of maintaining a terrorist network are more substantial and therefore easier to 
detect and disrupt. If these larger financial flows can be stemmed, the reach and 
capabilities of terrorist organizations can be curtailed.”172 
6.6 Global Politics and Interdependence 
The concept of international regimes as “sets of governing arrangements that 
affect relationships of interdependence,”173 has been developed by the traditional 
Realist school of International Relations, in response to the challenge of 
interdependence and to explain the growth in new forms of co-ordination and 
organization. However, in this approach, “international regimes are created by states 
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to further the state’s interests, and are not expected to survive the demise of the 
hegemon under which they were created;”174 hence, “states are viewed as the 
dominant actors in the international system, but co-operation in the form of 
international regimes may be necessary to secure the optimal outcome under 
conditions of interdependence in some situations.”175 
International regimes can and do influence behavior and outcomes in the 
international arena independently of the wishes or needs of state actors. As Keohane 
states, “if international regimes did not exist they would have to be invented,”176 but 
in order for the concept to be analytically useful we need to see regimes as having an 
independent impact on world politics through a synthesis of regime literature with the 
literature on issues, developed by writers such as Rosenau, Mansbach and Vasquez, 
and Keohane and Nye, from a more thorough use of the concept of interdependence. 
An alternative approach to the traditional Realist school of thought is the 
paradigm variously known as pluralism, the multi-centric approach, issue-politics, or 
the term most commonly used, Globalism. Globalism attempts to synthesize the 
literature on interdependence (already introduced) and international regimes with the 
literature on foreign policy analysis (developed by Rosenau), the literature on trans-
nationalism and international organizations (developed by Mansbach and Vasquez 
(1981)). In this way Globalism allows for a greater understanding of the dynamics of 
change in the ever changing arena of world politics, whereas mere adaptations to an 
approach which emphasizes anarchy and continuity cannot do so. In Globalism, 
international regimes are central. 
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6.7 Developing and Implementing Global Standards 
The FATF’s naming and shaming mechanism had successfully compelled 
most of the world’s least regulated jurisdictions to abandon traditional notions of bank 
secrecy, and pledge that their financial institutions implement proper due diligence 
and Know Your Customer measures. But such tools are lacking since they were 
unsuccessful in building capacity at a national level to assess the objective and 
integrity of cross-border financial transactions. It is irrational to expect a small 
jurisdiction that hosts a subsidiary of a major international financial institution to 
understand the cross-border transactions of the subsidiary, let alone by its affiliates or 
overseas parent. 
Although the most sophisticated and best regulated financial centers, including 
those of the G8, European Union, and Switzerland, fall short of exercising enough 
oversight over the global enterprises they license, they remain the most important 
nodes in the global financial system infrastructure. “So far these institutions and those 
competing with them have always taken advantage of the substantial regulatory and 
enforcement arbitrage afforded by the gaps in government laws and capacity to 
launder the illicit profits, and thereby facilitate the circumvention of national laws.”177 
“All of the existing initiatives to promote financial transparency fail in part to 
tackle this problem. The FATF exercises focus on jurisdictions, not 
institutions, and generate black-lists, but no white lists of jurisdictions that 
have met the highest standards of best practices. Even if every country and 
territory in the world were to agree upon their standards, local failures of 
governmental capacity to regulate or to enforce would preserve the ability of 
private financial institutions that were so inclined to circumvent the global 
standards.”178 
The foregoing standards have been formidable and innovative yet few expect 
that they will be enough. The question remains as to whether additional measures 
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should be developed that combine the best features of existing initiatives into a 
regime that further attenuates regulatory and enforcement arbitrage, holds the private 
sector financial services infrastructure accountable, and provides incentives to 
institutions that implement international standards and adopt best practices. 
As has been mentioned earlier in this work, the terrorism phenomenon can be 
seen as a number of separate, identifiable issues which can be isolated into distinct 
issue-systems composed of actors in contention over related values. For the actors in 
the financial issue-system only one of terrorism issues is salient, that of the problem 
of money laundering. 
The adherence of the actors to the global standards can be seen to be 
determined, firstly, by how salient they perceive the standards to be to them in 
allocating stakes to satisfy a particular value by which they are guided. As has been 
explained, banking stability and soundness was threatened by the increase in money 
laundering related crimes and therefore rules such as Know Your Customer and 
Suspicious Transactions Reporting have replaced see no evil, hear no evil in the 
pursuit of efficiency and profit, which seemed so prevalent in the past. Secondly, an 
actor may be influenced by other actors into adhering to a particular standard. This 
process of socialization can be seen to have influenced the banks and financial 
institutions into accepting the ethical norms of the Basel Committee and is 
fundamental to the work of the FATF. 
Krasner’s definition of regime as featuring “principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures”179 is met by the Financial Action Task Force in this 
given area of international relations. The norm that banks should not profit from illicit 
funds is nearly universally accepted. The norms and standards of the regime can be 
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seen to have been developed by the Basel Committee and the work of the United 
Nations. The Council of Europe, the European Economic Community and the United 
States can be seen to have started to develop regional regimes for the control of 
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. However, the Financial 
Action Task Force is the only global body whose focus is exclusively on money 
laundering. The emergence of the Financial Action Task Force can be seen as the 
decision-making focus of a global money-laundering and financing of terrorism 
control regime. 
Power is the ability to influence others to produce the outcomes one wants. 
Unlike hard power, which works through payments and coercion (carrots and sticks); 
soft power works through attraction and co-option. It is based on culture, political 
ideals, and policies. When you persuade others to want what you want, you do not 
have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. 
6.8 Soft Power and Terrorism 
As a result of 9/11 and the wars that followed it (the war on terrorism, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq), previous constructions of national and transnational identities 
have been both reaffirmed and revised. However, what happened after September 11 
was neither the inevitable result of developments in post-Cold War foreign policy nor 
a natural response to a terrorist attack. The war on terrorism was part of a larger post-
Cold War vision that was fractured between two contending models, one focused on 
an inevitable “clash of civilizations between the West and Islam;”180 the other argued 
for what might be described as a domino-democracy theory, which assumed that 
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people in the Middle East and the Muslim world had aspirations to be as much like 
the West as possible. 
With history on its predestined path, the sword, which was later so lavishly 
wielded by the Bush administration in an era darkened by 9/11, could be safely tucked 
away. But who was the enemy, if any? Bill Clinton gave a prescient answer: “We are 
all vulnerable to the reckless acts of rogue states and to unholy axis of terrorists, drug 
traffickers, and international criminals. These 21
st
 century predators feed on the very 
free flow of information and ideas and people we cherish. They abuse the vast power 
of technology to build black markets for weapons, to compromise law enforcement 
with huge bribes of illicit cash, to launder money with the keystroke of a computer. 
These forces are our enemies.”181 
In The Paradox of American Power, “Joseph Nye opened an important 
discussion about the varieties of power that the United States brings to bear as it goes 
about the task of building its world order.”182 Nye concentrated on two types of 
power: hard and soft. In Nye’s analysis, hard power (military and economic power) 
works because it can make people do what you want them to do. Soft power – cultural 
power, the power of example, the power of ideas and ideals – works more subtly: it 
makes others want what you want. In the case of the American world order, soft 
power upholds the order because it influences others to like the American system and 
support it of their own will. 
According to Nye, “soft power is not weakness; on the contrary, it is the 
failure to use soft power effectively that weakens America in the struggle against 
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terrorism.”183 Hard power, which relies on coercion, grows out from military and 
economic might. It remains indispensable in a world populated by threatening states 
and terrorist organizations. But soft power will become increasingly crucial in 
preventing terrorists from recruiting new supporters, and for obtaining the 
international cooperation necessary for countering terrorism. 
America remains the one most powerful nation since the Roman Empire, but 
like Rome, America is neither invincible nor invulnerable. Rome did not succumb to 
the rise of another empire, but to the onslaught of waves of barbarians. Modern high-
tech terrorists are the new barbarians. The U.S. cannot alone hunt down every Bin 
Laden or suspected Al Qaeda leader. Nor can it launch a war whenever it wishes 
without alienating other countries. 
The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations – Islam versus the West – 
but a civil war within Islamic civilization between extremists who use violence to 
enforce their ideas and a moderate majority who wants things like jobs, education, 
health care, and dignity as they pursue their faith. America will not win unless the 
moderates win. 
The rigidity of the Cold War gave the discipline of International Relations an 
excuse for not taking into account the advances, concepts and methods from 
alternative disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, anthropology, and history, with 
their concepts of identity, values and community. The connections among these and 
International Relations need to be explored in order to understand and respond to the 
current changes in world politics. 
“With the Cold War’s end, Americans became more interested in budget 
savings than in investing in soft power. Indeed, the combined cost for the State 
Department’s public diplomacy programs and all of America’s international 
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broadcasting is just over $1 billion, about the same amount spent by Britain or 
France, countries that are one-fifth America’s size and whose military budgets 
are only 25% as large. No one would suggest that America spend as much to 
launch ideas as to launch bombs, but it does seem odd that the U.S. spends 400 
times as much on hard power as on soft power. If the U.S. spent just 1% of the 
military budget on soft power, it would quadruple its current spending on this 
key component of the war on terrorism. If it is to win that war, its leaders are 
going to have to do better at combining soft and hard power into smart 
power.”184 
 
To conclude, the rationale for how and why issues come on to the agenda, and 
how and why regimes are created from certain issues and not others, is showed as 
different stages in the same process of agenda-building. A clearer understanding of 
values and norms, their evolution and role in international decision-making, is needed 
to give international regimes an independent impact in international relations and is 
also central for an alternative understanding of change in world politics. For the 
traditional Realists, change in world politics is defined in terms of changes in state 
power, and the emergence of regimes is similarly defined. An alternative approach to 
the emergence and role of international regimes challenges this established belief by 
asserting that agendas are determined by the attempts of actors to allocate values 
authoritatively on specific issues. Therefore new actors can be considered from both 
above and below the state, and we do not just need to consider the state. 
This thesis has aimed at not only answering the question how Lebanon has 
sustained its leading role as one of the most important financial and banking systems 
in the region based on its longstanding banking secrecy law while maintaining 
compliance with international standards, but also by setting the terrorism phenomenon 
into an initial theoretical framework within International Relations theory. The 
significance of what are viewed as the two major competing paradigms to explore the 
complexity of a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional phenomenon has been 
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examined. The belief in a regime analysis which emphasizes the role of norms and 
values in agenda-formation, rather than focusing on rules and decision-making 
procedures, is necessary for an understanding of how best to fight terrorism. 
Lebanese authorities, especially the Central Bank, deal with a banking system 
that is the most developed in the region. The country’s familiarity with economic 
stresses and past experiences has informed a vigilant Central Bank in its attitude 
towards troubled institutions. The Central Bank’s first point of action is the 
supervision and monitoring through direct intervention as in the case of al Madina 
Bank in July 2003. The Central Bank took control of al Madina on charges that the 
bank’s management was involved in embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, 
fraudulent practices, and failure to abide by standard accounting principles. Hence, 
the Special Investigation Commission issued a freeze of accounts and assets order 
linked to 19 individuals (including the chairman of the bank) in addition to two 
related entities. In other cases, the Central Bank may request that the troubled bank 
increases provisions, improves risk controls, or injects extra capital. When these 
measures fail, the Higher Banking Control Commission will enforce a number of 
measures in attempt to remedy the situation. Consequently, the bank in question could 
be forced to either merge with a stronger peer or go into voluntary liquidation as in 
the case of the Lebanese Canadian Bank that was discussed earlier in the thesis. 
But there remain much to be done. The use of financial channels to conceal 
and transfer the proceeds of criminal activity and to facilitate the funding of terrorist 
operations is a problem that will not disappear. As the systems for combating money 
laundering and terrorist financing are reinforced, criminal and terrorist organizations 
will continue to adapt their methods in order to circumvent the safeguards put in 
place. There is therefore a critical need for all stakeholders to remain vigilant in 
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identifying and responding to changing threats in order to prevent abusers of the 
financial system from remaining one step ahead of efforts to curb their activities. 
Terrorist organizations will continue to receive crucial support, in some cases active 
financial and material support, from safe havens, failed states, and state-sponsors of 
terrorism. Such support may simply reflect weak government. 
Enhancing the Lebanese government’s capacity and commitment to 
undertaking a strategic surveillance initiative and national threat assessment that, as it 
matures, will provide a long-term view of money laundering and terrorist financing 
threats is central in identifying systemic threats and encourage new thinking about 
priorities and counter-measures. While engaging law enforcement authorities and well 
informed oversight bodies even as opting for financial transparency are key factors in 
creating a long-term solution in responding to an ever changing global environment. 
Within this strategic context of government empowerment and materializing of a 
Private Sector Dialogue (PSD) would reflect adherence to international norms and 
standards, in such a way future assistance and collaboration with the international 
organizations should have a twofold aim; augmenting political stability and restoring 
confidence within the financial system, to attract investment. 
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